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ASPIRATIONS AND SETTLEMENT
Russell Korobkint
The legal-academic literature on litigation settlement describes a range
offactors that affect settlement outcomes, but litigant "aspirations "--or ideal
goals-are not among them. Negotiation scholars, however, routinely claim
that high aspirations can improve bargaining outcomes. This Article
presents the "reference point theory of aspirations," which reconciles these
competing approaches by situating negotiator aspirations within the stan-
dard legal-academic model of settlement. Based on this theory, the Article
offers a series of hypotheses concerning the role of aspirations in settlement
negotiations, and then reports the results of experimental tests that demon-
strate the hypotheses to be plausible. Finally, in light of the reference point
theory of aspirations, the Article reconsiders the usual prescriptive advice of-
fered by negotiation scholars that litigants always should set high aspirations
for themselves in bargaining situations.
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INTRODUCTION
What determines whether litigants settle out of court or demand
an adjudicatory resolution of their dispute? When a lawsuit does set-
tle, what determines the settlement price? Law-and-economics schol-
arship has addressed this situation primarily by reference to the
parties' reservation prices-the maximum amount a defendant is will-
ing to pay to settle the case and the minimum amount a plaintiff is
willing to accept-and secondarily by reference to strategic behavior
that might lead a rational litigant to refuse a settlement offer that is
superior to his reservation price.
Recent legal scholarship that incorporates behavioral insights
from psychology and other non-economic social sciences into theories
of settlement suggests that a more nuanced understanding of liti-
gants' preferences than the economics-based approach provides can
improve our understanding of settlement behavior.1 This new area of
scholarship, however, does not challenge the theoretical framework of
the economic model, so much as it provides a richer account of both
what might affect litigants' reservation prices and what might cause
litigants to reject even settlement offers superior to their reservation
prices. Thus, I will refer to the law-and-economics perspective to-
gether with the newer behavioral science insights collectively as the
"standard model" of settlement.
I See discussion infra Part I.B.
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The standard model notably omits any detailed consideration of
whether and how litigants' "aspirations"-sometimes synonymously
referred to as "goals" or "targets"-play a role in settlement.2 The
term "aspiration" is defined here as the ideal target settlement sum, or
set of terms, for which a litigant strives in negotiations, although
achieving that target provides no discontinuous external benefit.3
This measure is differentiated from a litigant's reservation price, de-
fined as the minimum that the litigant will accept (if the plaintiff) or
the maximum amount that the litigant will pay (if the defendant) .4
The omission of aspirations from the standard model is troubling
for two reasons. First, popular and scholarly literature on negotiation
often contends that negotiator aspirations are an important indepen-
dent determinant of bargaining outcomes. 5 Second, this literature
suggests that negotiators are able to choose their own aspirations, at
least within some boundaries. The latter point implies that under-
standing the role of aspirations in settlement has the potential not
only to deepen negotiators' understanding of settlement bargaining,
but also to enable negotiators to improve their individual outcomes.
The usual claim is that negotiators who set high aspirations, defined
as target goals far above their reservation price, will achieve superior
outcomes compared to negotiators with low aspirations.6
This Article explores the discrepancy between the standard
model of litigation, which ignores negotiator aspirations, and the gen-
eral negotiation literature, which identifies aspirations as central to
understanding (and succeeding) in bargaining. The Article also ad-
vances a theory of how the effect of aspirations can be incorporated
into the framework of the standard model, and provides experimental
evidence consistent with the theory. The "reference point theory of
aspirations" holds that negotiator aspirations can affect a variety of
factors ("settlement levers") that litigation scholars using the standard
model have heretofore identified as important to settlement behavior,
and thus that aspirations can indirectly affect settlement outcomes.7
The experimental results provide preliminary support for the theory, 8
2 See discussion infra Part I.
3 Cf Chip Heath et al., Goals as Reference Points, 38 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 79, 80-81
(1999) (calling targets not accompanied by a change in material rewards "mere goals" to
distinguish them from goals that are accompanied by an external reward, such as when "a
salesperson sets a goal to sell 200 units because he or she receives a bonus at 200"). This
definition is, I believe, the dominant definition in the legal and social science negotiation
literature.
4 See sources cited infra note 10.
5 See discussion infta Part II.
6 See discussion infra Part Il.B.
7 See discussion infra Part 1II.A.
8 See discussion infra Part III.B.
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although further research is necessary to understand fully the nature
of the relationship between aspirations and settlement outcomes.
More broadly, the findings provide, for the first time, empirical
support for two tentative claims about aspirations and settlement ne-
gotiations, the first directly and the second indirectly. First, litigants
with high aspirations are likely to obtain more-favorable outcomes
than those with low aspirations, because high aspirations can cause
litigants to set higher reservation prices, to bargain for a longer period
of time before reaching agreement, and to perceive less beneficial
outcomes as unfair and thus be less likely to agree to such outcomes.
Second, litigants with high aspirations are more likely to fail to reach a
settlement than litigants with low aspirations, even when settlement
would be in the best interests of both parties. This is because all of
the reasons that higher aspirations might improve litigants' settlement
outcomes when agreement is reached also simultaneously imply a re-
duction in the range of outcomes that are potentially acceptable to
both parties. Further, the experiments provide support for the claim
that high aspirations are likely to cause litigants to be less satisfied with
settlements reached compared to litigants with low aspirations.
Part I of this Article lays the groundwork for the later empirical
work by describing the basic law-and-economics and more recent "law-
and-behavioral-science". perspectives concerning which factors affect
settlement outcomes. This body of literature noticeably fails to take
account of litigant aspirations and, in fact, its reasoning implicitly sug-
gests that aspirations are actually not relevant to settlement negotia-
tion outcomes.
Part II reviews the conventional wisdom among scholars inter-
ested in negotiation generally, as opposed to settlement negotiation
specifically, which holds that aspirations can affect bargaining out-
comes, as well as the empirical evidence that supports this common
perception. It concludes that, although the empirical evidence is not
conclusive and the justifications for the importance of aspirations are
not obviously correct, there are reasons to believe that aspirations
might play an important role in settlement outcomes.
Part III attempts to bridge the gap between the standard model
of settlement and the negotiation literature on aspirations in bargain-
ing generally by presenting the reference point theory of aspirations.
This Part then presents a series of specific hypotheses as to how aspira-
9 See generally Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science. Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1051 (2000) (sug-
gesting that a law-and-behavioral-science perspective may provide a more nuanced
understanding of human behavior). This perspective is alternatively referred to as "behav-
ioral law and economics." See, e.g., BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1471 (1998).
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tions might affect those factors identified as "settlement levers" by the
standard model of settlement and thus indirectly affect settlement ne-
gotiation outcomes. Each hypothesis is tested in an experimental set-
ting, and statistically significant results are presented, along with a
discussion of what further inquiries are necessary to test the general
theory more fully.
Based on the theory and experimental results presented in Part
III, Part IV revisits the common but inadequately supported claim that
negotiators will achieve more-desirable results if they set high aspira-
tions rather than low aspirations. Part IV concludes that a prescriptive
approach to aspirations should balance the benefits of high aspira-
tions against their corresponding costs.
I
THE STANDARD MODEL OF SETTLEMENT
A. Law-and-Economics Approaches to Settlement Behavior
1. The Central Importance of Reservation Prices to Settlement
Negotiations
In any bargaining situation, negotiators have a reservation price,
defined as the maximum amount the negotiator is willing to give up
or the minimum amount the negotiator is willing to accept, as the
case may be, to consummate a transaction. 10 Buyers would prefer to
pay any amount up to their reservation price for the subject of the
negotiation rather than walk away without a deal, but for any higher
price they would prefer not to reach an agreement. Sellers would pre-
fer to trade the subject of the negotiation for any amount that exceeds
their reservation price; for any lesser amount, they would prefer not to
reach an agreement. All points along the range of potential agree-
ments between a buyer's and seller's reservation price, (assuming that
the buyer's is higher), are all mutually beneficial, or, in economic
terms, "Pareto superior"'I to the alternative of not reaching an agree-
ment. This range of points is often labeled the bargaining zone,12 and
10 See, e.g., DAVID A. LAX &JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAIN-
ING FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN 51 (1986); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND
SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 45 (1982); G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGO-
TIATION STRATEGIES FOR REASONABLE PEOPLE 27 (1999); Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based
Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiation, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 49 (1985).
11 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 14-15 (5th ed. 1998) (de-
fining a Pareto-superior allocation as one that "makes at least one person better off and no
one worse off').
12 See, e.g., SHELL, supra note 10, at 27-29; Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal
Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J. 1789, 1816-17 (2000). Other authors use a range of similar, sy-
nonymous terms. See, e.g., LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 10, at 247 ("bargaining set"); RoB-
ERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND
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the conceptual framework for understanding negotiation is some-
times referred to as the "bargaining zone model."1 3
The law-and-economics approach to litigation settlement predicts
that where a bargaining zone exists (that is, where the defendant's
reservation price for settlement is higher than the plaintiffs), disputes
will settle at some point within the zone. 14 Where there is no bargain-
ing zone, settlement attempts will fail and adjudication will result.1 5
To predict whether a bargaining zone will exist in a particular
dispute and, if so, what its endpoints will be, this approach relies on
common assumptions of "expected utility theory"16 or, more gener-
ally, "rational choice theory," 17 regarding the manner in which liti-
gants will determine their reservation prices. The standard law-and-
economics perspective on settlement negotiations, exemplified by a
landmark article by George Priest and Benjamin Klein,1 8 predicts that
litigants will determine their reservation prices based on the expected
value of litigating and the difference in transaction costs between set-
tling out of court and litigating to judgment. 19
To calculate the expected value of litigation, assuming that liabil-
ity is disputed and damages are not, litigants will multiply their esti-
mate of the plaintiff's chances of prevailing on the liability issue by the
plaintiff's damage. 211 If damages are also at issue the calculation is
more complicated, but the basic reasoning remains the same: both
litigants will value litigation based on the weighted average value of all
potential outcomes. 21
In any particular case, the litigants may reach different estimates
of the expected value of litigation because making such estimates is
far from an exact science. But because the plaintiff and defendant
presumably have access to the same information about the dispute (at
DISPUTES 20 (2000) ("Zone of Possible Agreement"); RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 45 ("zone of
agreement").
13 See, e.g., Sally Blountetal., The Price is Right-Or Is It? A Reference Point Model of Two-
Party Price Negotiations, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1, 1-2
(1996).
14 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 607-08; John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279, 285-86 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of
the Courts, 14J.L. & ECON. 61, 66-69 (1971).
15 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 608; Gould, supra note 14, at 285.
16 See generally SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
79-83 (1993) (describing expected utility theory as a "normative" theory of behavior that
describes how people actually behave).
17 For a discussion of how the assumptions of rational choice theory are used in legal
scholarship generally, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 9, at 1060-75.
18 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984).
19 See id. at 12-13.
20 See id. at 12.
21 See id. at 29-30 (noting that the same model applies when plaintiffs and defendants
disagree about damages rather than liability).
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least after discovery), on average, there should be no difference be-
tween plaintiff and defendant estimates. When there are differences,
it is equally likely that the plaintiff will be more optimistic or pessimis-
tic than the defendant about her chances in court. 22
Because adjudication usually has much higher transaction costs
(the largest factor being attorneys' fees23) than does settlement,24 the
estimated expected value of litigation seldom matches a litigant's res-
ervation price. When determining their reservation price, rational
plaintiffs will subtract the amount of money they will save in transac-
tion costs if they settle out of court from their estimate of the ex-
pected value of litigating.25 Rational defendants will add the amount
of money they will save in transaction costs by settling to their estimate
of the expected value of the plaintiffs claim in order to determine
their reservation price.26 Thus, for example, if the plaintiff and defen-
dant each believe the plaintiff has a 50% chance of winning a court
verdict, the plaintiffs damages are $200,000, and the plaintiff and de-
fendant would each spend $20,000 more in legal fees to litigate than
to settle, the plaintiff's reservation price should be $80,000, the defen-
dant's reservation price should be $120,000, and the model predicts
that the parties would settle for some amount between those two
values.
Slightly more complex versions of this basic approach also take
account of other relevant factors in setting a reservation price.2 7 For
example, according to standard accounts of rational choice theory,
individual litigants are presumed to be risk averse. 28 Thus, in the ex-
ample above, depending on how risk averse they are, a plaintiff may
set her reservation price below $80,000 and a defendant above
$120,000 to take account of the certainty settlement provides, which is
preferred to the expected value of the risk of adjudication. 29 Also,
rational litigants are presumed to take into account the time value of
money. This means that, assuming no prejudgment interest is availa-
ble, a plaintiff will set her reservation price for a settlement today even
22 See id. at 13-14.
23 See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinay Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,
91-92 (1983) (noting that attorneys' fees constitute the largest litigation expense).
24 The costs of adjudication are usually so much greater than the costs of settling out
of court that some theorists simplify the analysis by assuming the costs of settling to be
zero. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1075 (1989).
25 See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 12-13.
26 See id.
27 For a comprehensive review of the factors lawyers use and should consider when
determining the settlement value of a case, see Peter Toll Hoffman, Valuation of Cases for
Settlement: Theory and Practice, 1991 J. Disp. REsOL. 1 (1991).
28 See POSNER, supra note 11, at 12-13.
29 See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 24, at 1076 (describing how risk aversion may
cause the subjective value of trial to diverge from its expected value).
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lower than the risk-adjusted expected value of litigation less transac-
tion costs.3 0 Precisely how much the value of time will reduce the
plaintiffs reservation price depends on both the amount of time it
would take to secure an adjudicated resolution of the dispute and on
the plaintiff's personal discount rate.31 The defendant, in contrast,
will prefer to keep his money for longer, so he too will discount the
expected value of a plaintiff verdict and set his reservation price for
settlement correspondingly lower. 32
According to this traditional approach, the observed high rate of
settlement 33 is expected because plaintiffs and defendants are pre-
sumed to make similar predictions about the value of adjudication,34
and transaction costs (and in some models, risk aversion) give each
side a desire to settle. 35 Therefore, settlement efforts will fail, and
adjudication will result, only when (1) the plaintiff and defendant
have different estimates of the expected value of litigation, (2) the
plaintiffs estimate is higher than the defendant's, and (3) the two
estimates differ by more than the combined transaction costs (and
risk-aversion effects) of the parties. 36 This model offers no predic-
30 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Ad-
ministration, 2J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 420-21 (1973).
31 A litigant's discount rate depends on a variety of factors, including saving and bor-
rowing rates, the prime rate, inflation, risk coverage, and taxes. See GERALD R. WILLIAMS,
LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 127-28 (1983). In a more general sense, the dis-
count rate is anything that contributes to a smaller payoff, represented in economic terms.
Cf Posner, supra note 30, at 420-21 (explaining that plaintiffs and prosecutors have
greater discount values than defendants because of higher borrowing costs for individuals
to finance their lawsuit, and because delay increases costs for the party with the burden of
proof, who needs to discover evidence and prove facts).
32 Notice that, unlike risk aversion and transaction costs, which make the plaintiff's
reservation price lower and the defendant's reservation price higher, the time value of
money shifts both parties' reservation prices lower, at least if there is no prejudgment inter-
est. See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 27, at 25.
33 Commentators disagree about the precise rate of settlement, but agree that the
rate is extremely high and that court resolution of disputes is the relatively rare exception
rather than the rule. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle ":Judicial Promo-
tion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994) (indicating that settle-
ment is the most frequent disposition of civil cases); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1996)
(noting that the "great majority" of cases filed are settled); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really
Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1212 (1992) (stating that "[slettlement is where the action is"); Trubek et al.,
supra note 23, at 81 (noting that fewer than 8% of civil suits in the authors' sample were
resolved by trial).
34 See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 13-14.
35 See, e.g., Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 24, at 1076; Gould, supra note 14, at 286;
Landes, supra note 14, at 66.
36 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 609; Gould, supra note 14, at 285-86; Landes,
supra note 14, at 67-68; Posner, supra note 30, at 417-18.
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tions about the precise settlement amount, only that the amount will
fall somewhere within the bargaining zone. 37
2. Strategic Considerations
a. Risk Preference and Bargaining Behavior
Insights from game theory have enabled other law-and-economics
scholars to enhance this model of settlement, either by questioning
whether all lawsuits in which a bargaining zone exists will result in
settlement or by suggesting what settlement value within the bargain-
ing zone the parties will ultimately agree upon.
Robert Cooter and his coauthors argue that rational litigants will
not always accept a settlement offer that is superior to their reserva-
tion price.38 If a plaintiff receives a settlement offer of $90,000 from a
defendant, for example, she not only must consider whether this
amount exceeds her reservation price, but also the uncertain conse-
quences of rejecting this offer.39
Assuming that the plaintiffs reservation price is below $90,000, if
the plaintiff knew that the defendant's reservation price was exactly
$90,000, the plaintiff would accept the offer. If the plaintiff knew that
the defendant's reservation price was $120,000, however, she might
refuse the offer and demand more, knowing that the rational defen-
dant should be willing to pay up to $120,000. In most situations, liti-
gants do not know their opponents' reservation price with certainty,
but can only estimate that price.40 Thus, by rejecting a defendant's
offer that is above her reservation price, the plaintiff risks causing a
bargaining impasse.
Assume, for example, that the plaintiff's reservation price is
$80,000, and she believes there is a 50% chance that the defendant's
reservation price is $90,000 and a 50% chance that it is $110,000. A
risk-neutral plaintiff would then rationally reject a $90,000 settlement
offer and risk an impasse because such a strategy would have a 50%
chance of costing her $10,000 (the difference between her $80,000
reservation price and the $90,000 offered) but a 50% chance of earn-
ing her an additional $20,000 (in the form of a higher settlement). A
37 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 27, at 5; see also sources cited supra note 36.
38 Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic
Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982).
39 See generally id. at 226, 237 (stating that the direct effect of holding out for a higher
amount is an increase in the likelihood of trial).
40 Cf id. at 231-32 (stating that each party to litigation has observable and unobserv-
able traits that bear upon his strategy, but that each forms expectations about his opponent
based only upon observable traits); Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 24, at 1079 (noting that
bargainers might overestimate the willingness of their opponent to make concessions, lead-
ing to a failure to settle).
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risk-averse plaintiff, in contrast, might accept the $90,000 offer be-
cause it provides a certain $10,000 benefit.
b. Patience
The insights of Cooter and his coauthors suggest that the range
of possible settlements is smaller than the full range of points within
the bargaining zone because litigants will strategically reject settle-
ment offers that are superior to their reservation prices if the benefit
of accepting the offer is lower than the average expected return of
holding out for a better settlement value. This analysis begs the ques-
tion, however, of how lawsuits ever settle, and for what amount, when
both parties know (or strongly suspect) that there is a large bargain-
ing zone and have similar risk preferences. Consider, for example, a
negotiation in which the plaintiffs reservation price is $90,000, the
defendant's reservation price is $120,000, these figures are "common
knowledge,' 4 1 and both parties are risk neutral. Knowing the defen-
dant's reservation price, a plaintiff might demand $119,000. A ra-
tional defendant should agree to pay that much, except for the fact that
he knows a rational plaintiff should be willing to accept $91,000!
Game theorists have proposed that this stalemate will be broken,
and some settlement amount within the bargaining zone agreed
upon, on the basis of the relative costs to the parties of delaying an
agreement. 42 That is, the party with the most patience should win the
lion's share of the cooperative surplus.43 Patience is measured by
comparing the value that the negotiator places on an immediate
agreement to the value that she would place on a delayed agreement
reached only after further bargaining. 44 A negotiator is relatively pa-
tient if she places a relatively low premium on immediate versus
delayed agreement (that is, has a low discount rate). 45 The more pa-
tient party is more willing to delay agreement, and because the less
patient party knows this, she has an incentive to make concessions to
avoid delay. 46
41 That is, both litigants know both parties' reservation prices, and both know that the
other knows. See DoucLAs G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 304 (1994).
42 See id. at 222.
43 Cf Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97,
98-99 (1982) (observing that in an alternating-offer bargaining game with a fixed bargain-
ing cost or fixed discounting factor, and both players being rational, the player who pro-
poses first has relative advantage, and the more impatient party will always end up with less
than half the subject of the bargain).
44 See BAIRD ET AL., supra note 41, at 222.
45 See, e.g., Nirvikar Singh, Nash Bargaining with the Option to Wait, 55 ECON. LETTERS
69, 71 (1997) ("[T]he more patient player benefits from the possibility of
postponement.").
46 Cf id. (stating that the party with the lower discount rate is better off if the possibil-
ity of postponement of bargaining to another period exists, while the party with the higher
discount rate is worse off in the same situation).
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Assume, for example, that the defendant must pay his attorney a
$1000-per-day retainer for each day prior to a settlement being
reached, and that the plaintiff is willing to wait indefinitely to reach an
agreement. In this case, the defendant should pay his reservation
price, knowing that if he offers less the plaintiff will decline the offer
and watch the defendant deplete his resources until he finally con-
cedes. Elaborate mathematical models suggest that, under the as-
sumptions of no private information and a system of alternating
offers, the litigants should split the difference between their reserva-
tion prices if they have identical costs of delay, and that a litigant with
twice the costs of delay of the opponent should accept one-third of
the cooperative surplus, and so on. 47
B. Modifications from Behavioral Decision Theory
In the last decade, legal scholarship drawing on empirical find-
ings of behavioral decision theory has taken issue with the reliance of
47 These models, known as "Rubinstein bargaining games," have spawned an elabo-
rate economic literature in the general bargaining context. For a plain explanation of the
role of impatience derived from Rubinstein's model, see H. Peyton Young, Negotiation Anal-
ysis, in NEGOTIATION ANALYSIS 1, 6-7 (H. Peyton Young ed., 1991). Both Rubinstein in his
original work and subsequent scholars attach various strict conditions to their games (for
example, players must make alternating offers with a certain period of time elapsing be-
tween each offer). These restrictions make it difficult to apply the models to real-life nego-
tiating situations, where parameters are rarely so strict and well defined. This literature,
however, can provide useful insights into how specified changes in the ground rules of
bargaining can affect the way rational parties should decide to divide a cooperative surplus.
See, e.g., Dilip Abreu & Faruk Gul, Bargaining and Reputation, 68 ECONOMETRICA 85 (2000)
(players are uncertain about the strategic intent or posture of their opponent); Lutz-Alex-
ander Busch & Quan Wen, Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model, 63 ECONOMETRICA 545
(1995) (bargaining over payoffs for the "disagreement period" following rejection of an
offer); Shinsuke Kambe, When Is There a Unique Equilibrium in Less Structured Bargaining?, 50
JAPANESE ECON. REV. 321 (1999) (players negotiate about who will make the next propo-
sal); Abhinay Muthoo, Bargaining in a Long-Term Relationship with Endogenous Termination,
66 J. ECON. THEORY 590 (1995) (repeated bargaining encounters between the same two
parties); Abhinay Muthoo, A Bargaining Model with Players' Perceptions on the Retractability of
Offers, 38 THEORY & DECISION 85 (1995) (the effect of "retractable" offers); Robert Powell,
Bargaining in the Shadow of Power, 15 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 255 (1996) (how power affects
agreement by giving a bargainer in a Rubinstein bargaining game the option of imposing a
settlement); Horst Raff & David Schmidt, Cumbersome Coordination in Repeated Games, 29
INr'LJ. GAME THEORY 101 (2000) (the role of communication between the parties in coor-
dinating agreement in a Rubinstein game); Singh, supra note 45 (each player may choose
to postpone the negotiations by one period). For studies criticizing the core assumptions
of Rubinstein bargaining games, see, for example, W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Mal-
comson, Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information, 28 CAN. J. ECON. 336, 337 (1995)
(arguing that the Rubinstein model is not appropriate for analyzing contract bargaining,
where time always elapses before the transaction is completed and there is always time for
parties to renege or renegotiate the contract); Matthew Spiegel et al., Understanding when
Agents Are Fairmen or Gamesmen, 7 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 104, 105 (1994) (finding in con-
trolled experiments that subjects with a relative bargaining advantage do not fully exploit
that advantage, and subjects with a relative bargaining disadvantage still tend to demand
an equal, rather than a lesser, division).
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economic models on the assumption that litigants will make settle-
ment decisions in accordance with the assumptions of rational choice
theory.48 Although there is some disagreement on this point, the be-
havioral scholarship on litigation presents more of a modification and
supplement to the traditional economic approaches rather than a par-
adigm shift. Most of this research can be viewed as implicitly (if not
explicitly) taking issue with either (1) the economic assumptions
about how litigants determine their reservation prices, or (2) which
settlement amounts will fail to garner agreement of the litigants even
though the amounts meet the necessary condition of being within the
bargaining zone. This literature does not, however, fundamentally
challenge the basic conclusion of law-and-economics theorists that a
bargaining zone lying between the litigants' reservation prices is a nec-
essary but not sufficient condition for settlement to occur.49
1. Non- "Rational" Perspectives on Reservation Prices
Scholars working in the field of "law and behavioral science" are
critical of the standard assumption of law-and-economics scholarship
that rational choice theory provides an adequately nuanced descrip-
tion of human behavior for the analysis of legal rules and institu-
tions. 50 The scholarship on settlement arising from this mode of
analysis most often attempts to demonstrate that a litigant's decision
of whether to accept a settlement will sometimes depend on factors
that would be considered irrelevant by devotees of rational choice the-
ory. The implication of this work is that litigants might determine
their reservation prices in a different way than the economic model
predicts.
One modification to the economic model is based on evidence
collected by social scientists that individuals' perceptions of the world
tend to be biased in a self-serving or "egocentric" direction. People
tend to view available evidence as being more supportive of their be-
liefs and positions than is objectively appropriate, to overestimate
their own skills and abilities, and to be unrealistically optimistic about
future life events. For example, studies have shown that fans of com-
peting football teams believed that their team committed significantly
fewer infractions than the fans of the opposing team perceived; 5' that
nearly all drivers believed they were better than average; 52 that people
48 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 9, at 1055.
49 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1816-17.
50 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 9, at 1055.
51 Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 130-32 (1954).
52 See David M. Dejoy, The Optimism Bias and Traffic Accident Risk Perception, 21 Acci-
DENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 333, 338-39 (1989); see alsoJames R. Dalziel & R.F. Soames
Job, Motor Vehicle Accidents, Fatigue and Optimism Bias in Taxi Drivers, 29 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
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engaged to be married believed their chances of getting divorced
were close to zero (although most knew the base rate is approximately
50%) ;58 that married couples' estimates of the percentage share of the
household chores that they perform routinely exceeds 100% when ad-
ded together;54 and that people believed there was an above-average
chance for positive events to occur to them, but a below-average
chance they would experience negative events. 55
George Loewenstein, and his coauthors demonstrated that liti-
gants might suffer from an egocentric bias when evaluating the
strength of their cases, thereby reducing the size of the bargaining
zone created by the transaction costs of seeking adjudication and pos-
sibly eliminating the zone altogether.56 In an experimental setting,
the authors asked subjects to play the role of either plaintiff or defen-
dant in a settlement negotiation and gave both subject groups identi-
cal information about the facts of a tort lawsuit. 57 According to the
traditional economic model of settlement, with its rational choice the-
ory roots, the subjects' role should be irrelevant to their analysis of the
expected value of litigation. 58
Consistent with the hypothesis derived from research on the ego-
centric bias, however, the experimenters found that subjects in the
role of plaintiff, on average, estimated that the litigation value of the
case was much higher than did subjects playing the role of defen-
dant.5 9 Taking the analysis one step further, the experimenters found
that the greater the difference in the parties' estimates of the value of
litigation, the less likely they were to reach a negotiated settlement. 60
Implicitly, the experiment found that the egocentric bias resulted in
plaintiffs having higher reservation prices relative to defendants than
the economic model would predict, and that the more egocentric the
& PREVENTION. 489, 492 (1997) (indicating that surveyed taxi drivers were overly optimistic
about their abilities to drive safely at high speeds, minimize injury to themselves in an
unavoidable accident, swerve around sudden road hazards, and control a skidding car).
53 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, Wen Every Relationship Is Above Average: Per-
ceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443
(1993).
54 Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, inJUDG-
MENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 179, 183-85 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982).
55 Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 807 (1980).
56 George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining,
22 J. LEGAL. STUD. 135, 138-39 (1993); see also Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of
Fairness in Bargaining, 85 Am. ECON. REV. 1337, 1337 (1995) (arguing that disputants' self-
serving biases reduce the likelihood of settlement).
57 Loewenstein et al., supra note 56, at 145.
58 See Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 13-14.
59 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 56, at 150-51.
60 See id. at 152-53.
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litigants' perceptions of the case, the less likely that a bargaining zone
would exist.
Another modification to the traditional economic model of set-
tlement is derived from the predictions of "prospect theory," the em-
pirically based theory of decision making offered by Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky as a descriptive alternative to expected
utility theory. 61 Prospect theory predicts that when individuals view a
choice between a certain prospect and a probabilistic (or risky) pros-
pect as the choice between two "gains," they will demonstrate risk
aversion-preferring the certain prospect to a risky prospect with the
same expected value-just as rational choice theory predicts. 62 But
when individuals view such a choice as one between "losses," they will
usually demonstrate risk-seeking behavior-preferring the risky pros-
pect to the certain one with the same expected value-contrary to
rational choice predictions. 63
Studies by Jeffrey Rachlinski, 64 Russell Korobkin and Chris Guth-
rie, 65 and Guthrie66 rely on this theory in constructing theories of set-
tlement. Rachlinski hypothesized that, in civil litigation, plaintiffs
would likely view the settlement versus litigation decision as a choice
between "gains," since they stood to receive money in either scenario,
whereas defendants would likely view the same decision as a choice
between "losses," since they stood to pay money in both scenarios. 67
In a series of experiments, he demonstrated that subjects assigned to
the role of defendant in a hypothetical lawsuit tended to prefer litiga-
tion to settlement when the two options had similar expected values,
whereas subjects assigned to the role of plaintiff, on average, pre-
ferred settlement.68
In another experiment, Guthrie and I asked two groups of sub-
jects to play the role of a plaintiff accident victim and to decide
whether they would prefer a settlement offer of $21,000 or a risky trial
61 For the first specification of prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tver-
sky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see also
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus.
S251 (1986) (stating that "deviations of actual behavior from the normative model are too
widespread to be ignored," and that individuals commonly violate basic rules of rational
choice theory).
62 See Daniel Kahneman, Reference Points, Anchors, Norms, and Mixed Feelings, 51 ORGANI-
ZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 296, 297 (1992).
63 See id.
64 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
113, 116 (1996).
65 Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An
Experimental Approach, 93 Micri. L. REV. 107, 109 (1994).
66 Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
163, 168-69 (2000).
67 See Rachlinski, supra note 64, at 135.
68 See id. at 135-40.
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with an expected value of $19,000.69 Those subjects for whom settle-
ment would leave the plaintiff better off financially than she was prior
to the accident (because settlement would cover her accident-related
expenses and resulted in a surplus) were more likely to prefer settle-
ment than were those subjects for whom settlement would leave the
plaintiff in a worse position than before the accident (because settle-
ment would not cover her accident-related expenses).7o From these
results, we concluded that litigants often have multiple reference
points from which they might evaluate the choice between settlement
and litigation.71 Both groups of plaintiff subjects should view settle-
ment as a certain "gain" and trial as a probabilistic gain if they use
their current (post-accident) position as their reference point. But if
subjects viewed the choice from the reference point of their pre-acci-
dent position, those playing the role of a plaintiff for whom $21,000
would be insufficient to restore her to her pre-accident position might
view settlement as a "loss" and trial as the only possibility of avoiding
the loss. These subjects, therefore, would prefer the risky option of
trial. This reference point would still cause the other group of sub-
jects to view settlement as a "gain," however, leading to risk-averse
behavior.72
Guthrie refined the Korobkin and Guthrie hypothesis regarding
litigants' risk preferences, relying on prospect theory's more specific
prediction that individuals' usual risk profiles will be reversed when
the risky prospect has a very low probability of occurring.7 3 Prospect
theory predicts that individuals are likely to be risk seekingwhen choos-
ing between "gains" of the same expected value when the probability
of the risky choice paying off is extremely small, and risk averse when
choosing between "losses" when the probability of the risky prospect
coming to pass is extremely small.7 4 Guthrie designed hypothetical liti-
gation scenarios that asked subjects to choose between a certain settle-
ment and a risky trial with the same expected value in which the
plaintiff was extremely unlikely to prevail, but the monetary verdict
69 See Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 65, at 130-33. The expected value represents
the plaintiffs recovery of either $28,000 or $10,000 at trial. Id. at 131.
70 See id. at 132-33.
71 See id. at 133.
72 Subjects for the experiment were undergraduate students. Id. at 120. In a later
study, Korobkin and Guthrie used practicing lawyers to play the role of the plaintiff's attor-
ney (rather than the plaintiff), and found that both experimental groups of attorney sub-
jects preferred certain settlement over the option of risky litigation with a lower expected
value. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at
the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77, 100 (1997). The authors hypothesized that law-
yers' training and experience might cause them to evaluate options more consistently with
expected utility theory than do non-lawyers. Id. at 87-88.
73 Guthrie, supra note 66, at 187.
74 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 61, at 281, 285-86.
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would be extremely large if she did prevail. 75 He found that, in this
context, plaintiff subjects were risk seeking and defendant subjects
risk averse. 76 From these results, Guthrie predicts that the bargaining
zone in settlement negotiations will be more favorable to plaintiffs
(i.e., relatively higher) in "nuisance suits"-those in which plaintiffs
have a very low likelihood of success-than in "ordinary" litigation-
those cases in which plaintiffs have a non-negligible chance of
prevailing. 77
2. Limitations on Settlements Within the Bargaining Zone
Empirical research also suggests that settlement amounts be-
tween a plaintiff's and defendant's reservation price may not be viable
points of settlement if one of the litigants believes that settling for that
amount would violate norms of fairness.
Experimental economists have found that subjects playing the
"ultimatum bargaining game" consistently behave in a way that contra-
dicts the predictions of rational choice theory. 78 In the game, one
party, the "proposer," is given a certain amount of money (the
"stake") by the experimenter. The proposer must suggest a division of
the stake between himself and the other party, the "responder." The
responder must either accept the proposal, in which case the stake is
divided in accordance with the proposal, or reject the proposal, in
which case the stake is returned to the experimenter and neither
party gets any money. Because money is the only item at stake in the
game, the outcomes of accepting and rejecting the proposed division
are clear and certain, and because all individuals presumably prefer
some money to none, the responder's reservation price should be the
lowest possible increment that the proposer can offer (for example,
one cent or, if the rules of the game require offers to be in increments
of twenty-five cents or $1, one such increment). Many iterations of
the game have been played in different settings, in different cultures,
and with the rules varied slightly. 79 A consistent finding is that re-
sponders often do reject non-zero offers, choosing nothing over some-
thing.80 The lower the offer, the more likely the responder is to reject
it, and when the offer is less than 30% of the stake, a majority of re-
75 Guthrie, supra note 66, at 188-90.
76 Id. at 190.
77 Id. at 191-95.
78 For discussion of the expansive ultimatum game literature, see Alvin E. Roth, Bar-
gaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMics 253, 282-302 (John H.
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); Colin Camerer & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Ulti-
matums, Dictators and Manners, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 209; Werner Gtlth & Rein-
hard Tietz, Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and Comparison of Experimental Results, 11
J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 417 (1990).
79 See sources cited supra note 78.
80 See, e.g., Camerer & Thaler, supra note 78, at 211.
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sponders often will reject the proposal.81 The standard explanation of
such results is that responders will not accept an offer that they believe
is "unfair," even if accepting the offer-would leave them better off.
It is a short analytic step to hypothesize that litigants will view
litigation settlement proposals in a similar vein and thus will poten-
tially reject offers that would make them better off than if they liti-
gated their cases to a final judgment. Legal scholars challenging the
economic model of settlement have thus suggested that a settlement
proposal must be viewed as fair to be viable, even if it falls within the
bargaining zone.8 2 The same outcome can be explained alternatively
as a consequence of litigants taking their desire to be treated fairly
into account when establishing their reservation price. Thus, due to
fairness concerns, a settlement proposal that would leave a litigant fi-
nancially better off than would litigation might nonetheless fall below
his reservation price.
A slightly different prediction that follows from "equity theory"8 3
is that litigants' propensity to accept settlement proposals might de-
pend on the extent to which they feel they are in a socially equitable
relationship with their opponent. A settlement proposal that might
be acceptable to a litigant who feels personally validated and fairly
treated by her opponent, despite the legal dispute, may be unaccept-
able to a litigant who feels ignored, unheard, or invalidated by her
opponent. In one experiment, for example, Guthrie and I found that
subjects playing the role of plaintiff in a landlord-tenant dispute were
more likely to accept a certain settlement proposal over a trial if the
landlord had failed to fix a problem with the tenant's apartment
through no fault of his own than if the landlord had repeatedly and
willfully ignored the tenant's complaint.8 4 This was the case even
when the law provided that the landlord was strictly liable for the
problems with the apartment, and thus the tenant's legal rights did
not depend on the reasons for the landlord's behavior.8 5 These re-
sults, like the ultimatum game findings, suggest the need for modifica-
tion of the economic model because litigants might reject settlement
81 See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Simon Gfichter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reci-
procity, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2000, at 159, 161.
82 Cf Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1816-31 (noting that failure to agree on how to
allocate fairly the cooperative surplus can cause negotiators, including litigants, to fail to
reach an agreement that would be superior to both parties' reservation prices).
83 Cf ELAINE WALSTER ET AL., EQUIr. THEORY AND RESEARCH 17-18 (1978) (claiming
that individuals' comparisons between themselves and others are an important component
of emotional well-being).
84 Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 65, at 144-47.
85 See id. at 163. The willingness of "tenants" to accept the settlement proposal in-
creased if they were told that the "bad" landlord had apologized for his negligence. The
increase, however, was not enough to match the acceptance level of "tenants" who were
suing a "good" landlord. Id. at 147-50.
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offers that fall within the bargaining zone if issues concerning their
relationship with an opponent make entering into an agreement with
that person unattractive.
C. The "Standard Model" and "Settlement Levers"
The law-and-economics approach to understanding settlement
and the more recent law-and-behavioral-science research rely on dif-
ferent assumptions about behavior. The strictly economic approach
assumes that litigants will act in accordance with a relatively severe
interpretation of rational choice theory, whereas law-and-behavioral-
science scholars take issue with these strict predictions.8 6 In seeking
to provide a nuanced understanding of settlement behavior, however,
these approaches are complementary, with the behavioral science in-
sights refining rather than contradicting the law-and-economics ap-
proach. The insights from the two approaches taken together thus
form what I refer to as the "standard model" of settlement bargaining.
The standard model, as described above, cannot render precise
predictions concerning settlement amounts in particular negotiations.
However, the model does identify a range of variables that one can
expect to affect the outcome of settlement negotiations-that is, the
likelihood that the negotiators will reach a settlement and, if they do,
in what dollar-amount range. I will refer to these variables as "settle-
ment levers." The reservation prices of both parties are obvious settle-
ment levers: a change in either negotiator's reservation price will,
depending on direction, make settlement either more or less likely,
and will expand or shrink the range of possible settlement values.
Each negotiator's reservation price is affected by the negotiator's esti-
mate of the expected value of litigation, the relative transaction costs
of settlement and adjudication, the negotiator's risk preference, and
the negotiator's discount rate. These variables, then, can also be un-
derstood as settlement levers.
The standard model recognizes that reservation prices, while im-
portant, do not tell the full story of settlement negotiation outcomes.
Whether or not settlement occurs, and at what price, depends also on
the negotiators' estimates of the opposing negotiator's reservation
price, their risk preferences for rejecting desirable settlement propos-
als in an effort to obtain even-more-desirable settlements, their pa-
tience in bargaining and perception of the opposing negotiator's
patience, and their perceptions of what agreement or agreements
86 See, e.g., Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 9, at 1055; Daniel A. Farber, Toward a New
Legal Realism, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 296 (2001) (reviewing BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOM-
ics, supra note 9) ("The behavioralists seek to continue the basic project of law and eco-
nomics by providing an improved model of choice.").
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would be fair under the circumstances. These variables, too, are set-
tlement levers.
Despite its interdisciplinary content and the range of variables
that it recognizes as important, the legal-academic literature on settle-
ment that constructs the standard model does not identify the negoti-
ators' aspirations as settlement levers. In fact, the standard model has
virtually nothing at all to say about aspirations. The concept of aspira-
tions is almost, if not entirely, absent from the relevant literature. The
remaining parts of this Article address this notable omission.
II
ASPIRATIONS IN NEGOTIATION
It is common conventional wisdom in texts on negotiation, some
of which are authored by legal scholars, that negotiator aspirations
affect bargaining outcomes.8 7 Although the concept is noticeably ab-
sent from the legal-academic literature on settlement specifically, ne-
gotiation experts writing in both scholarly and popular genres often
claim that aspirations are, in fact, one of the critical factors in bargain-
ing. In Bargaining for Advantage: Negotiation Strategies for Reasonable Peo-
ple, G. Richard Shell (a Wharton Business School professor but a
lawyer as well) argues that aspirations are more important than even
reservation prices, the fundamental variable in the standard model of
settlement.88 Popular negotiation trainer Chester Karrass adopts a
similar point of view, claiming that "[o]f all the journeys into negotia-
tion, [the study of aspirations] is perhaps the finest trip of all."89
A claim is not true simply because it was made by an expert, of
course. However, while one might quibble with Shell's and Karrass's
suggestions that aspirations are the most important determinant of
bargaining outcomes, there are sufficient empirical data to strongly
suggest that, at a minimum, aspirations play a role in bargaining.
These data are reviewed in Subpart A, below.
87 See generally Dirk Van Poucke & Marc Buelens, Predicting the Outcome of a Two-Party
Price Negotiation: Contribution of Reservation Price, Aspiration Price and Opening Offer, 23 J.
ECON. PSYCHOL. 67, 68 (2002) (citing social science articles that claim "higher aspiration
prices... lead to better payoffs"). For examples of legal scholars who make this claim, see,
for example, CHARLES B. CRAVER, EFFECTIVE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT 171-72
(2d ed. 1993); DONALD G. GIFFORD, LEGAL NEGOTIATION: THEORY AND APPUCATIONS 54
(1989); MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 34; MELISSA L. NELKEN, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIA-
TION 62-63 (2001); SHELL, supra note 10, at 22-37; WILLIAM URY, GETTING PAST No 25 (rev.
ed. 1993); WILLIAMS, supra note 31, at 48-49; Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Role of Hope in
Negotiation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1661, 1674-75 (1997). The number of non-legal negotiation
scholars who advance this claim is too large to catalog, but some examples include:
CHESTER L. KARRASS, THE NEGOTIATING GAME 43 (rev. ed. 1992); LAX & SEBENIUS, supra
note 10, at 130; DEAN G. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR 25-26 (1981).
88 See SHELL, supra note 10, at 27-28.
89 KARRASS, supra note 87, at 43.
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Less satisfying, however, are negotiation scholars' hypotheses con-
cerning the mechanism or mechanisms by which aspirations affect ne-
gotiation results (which are often inscrutable or at minimum can be
identified only via multiple inferential steps), and the empirical evi-
dence that supports these hypotheses (which is completely non-exis-
tent). Subpart B reviews some of the explanations of the role of
aspirations offered in the negotiation literature.
Part III then proposes a theory as to how aspirations could affect
settlement outcomes within the construct of the standard theory and
presents preliminary tests that demonstrate the theory's plausibility.
A. Empirical Evidence of the Importance of Aspirations
There is a substantial body of empirical research across a variety
of settings on the effect of goals on an individual's task perform-
ance. 90 Social scientists have found a strong positive correlation be-
tween the difficulty of goals and an individual's performance. That is,
when people are given (or choose their own) goals for the perform-
ance of tasks, they tend to perform better if the goals are difficult to
achieve than if they are easy to achieve. 91 The reasons usually offered
to explain these results are that difficult goals cause individuals to di-
rect more attention to a task, to expend more effort, and to do so with
more persistence. 92 In other words, goals motivate action.93
A related finding of note is that individuals usually perform better
when they have a specific, difficult goal than when they are told to "do
their best. '94 Presumably, these findings reflect that the vague "do-
your-best" goal can be interpreted by the individual to create a range
of performance outcomes that indicate satisfactory performance rela-
tive to the goal. 95
Most of the copious amounts of empirical evidence on the effects
of goals on performance, however, are collected in noncompetitive
settings. For example, in some of the most common types of experi-
90 An impressive amount of these data are collected, synthesized, and analyzed in
EDWIN A. LOCKE & GARY P. LATHAM, A THEORY OF GOAL SETrING AND TASK PERFORMANCE
(1990).
91 Id. at 27-29; see also Heath et al., supra note 3, at 81 (concluding from a review of
the goal-setting literature that "studies that have manipulated goal difficulty have found
that performance increases as the difficulty of the goal increases"); Gary P. Latham & Ed-
win A. Locke, Self-Regulation Through Goal Setting, 50 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECI-
SION PROCESSES 212, 214 (1991) (concluding that four hundred studies find a linear
relationship between goal difficulty and performance).
92 LocKE & LATHAM, supra note 90, at 86-108.
93 See Latham & Locke, supra note 91, at 213.
94 See LOCKE & LATHAM, supra note 90, at 29-31; Heath et al., supra note 3, at 81;
Latham & Locke, supra note 91, at 215 .
95 Cf Heath et al., supra note 3, at 99 (hypothesizing that "do-your-best" goals are
interpreted by subjects as providing an easier target level than the difficult, specific goals
that experimenters usually compare to "do-your-best" instructions).
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ments, subjects are asked to list a series of objects, complete a series of
math problems, do a repetitive clerical task for a. set period of time,
perform a physical task such as doing sit-ups, and so forth.9 6 In these
situations, individuals might lack not only motivation, but also any
idea of what level of performance is minimally acceptable and what
level is possible. It stands to reason that specific goals will give subjects
a basis for evaluating their performance that otherwise might be com-
pletely absent, and that a nonspecific "do-your-best" goal will not offer
much more guidance than no goal at all. And because performance
outcomes, within a reasonable range, are largely within the control of
the subject, it also stands to reason that the increased effort that a
specific goal might inspire would likely have a significant impact on
results.
It is not obvious, however, that these findings would translate to
the context of bargaining generally or settlement behavior specifi-
cally. First, according to the standard model of settlement, litigants
are presumed to know their own reservation price and to estimate
their opponent's reservation price.97 The litigant's own reservation
price represents the minimum acceptable negotiating performance,
while the estimation of the opponent's reservation price identifies the
maximum possible outcome. Thus, having a specific aspiration might
be less necessary as a guidepost in negotiation than in other tasks be-
cause there are at least two other visible reference points. Second, the
negotiation context is competitive rather than noncompetitive. The
opposing party actively tries to prevent the litigant from achieving a
high level of performance.98 Thus, even if specific aspirations lead to
increased effort on the part of the negotiator who wishes to attain the
target settlement, it is not obvious that the effort will translate into
96 See, e.g., LocKE & LATHAM, supra note 90, at 42 tbl.2-6.
97 See RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 46.
98 Modern negotiation theory stresses that bargaining is usually not a zero-sum game,
in which a benefit to one negotiator is a loss to the other in absolute terms. Rather, bar-
gaining has integrative potential that, when exploited, can make both parties better off.
See, e.g., ROGER FISHER ET AL., GE-I'rING TO YEs 71 (2d ed. 1991) ("[T]here almost always
exists the possibility of joint gain."). Although this is certainly true, in most negotiation
situations in which parties can identify mutually beneficial tradeoffs, at the end of the day
these gains from trade must be divided among the negotiators. It is a relatively rare situa-
tion in which all the issues or goods that one negotiator considers "good," the other con-
siders "bad," thus rendering negotiation a completely noncompetitive activity. For
example, consider the nursery rhyme in which Jack Spratt can eat no fat and his wife can
eat no lean. In that case, the negotiation between Mr. and Mrs. Spratt is noncompetitive,
because neither has any interest in what the other wants. In a more typical case, Jack
would like lean better than fat, and Mrs. Spratt would like fat better than lean, but both
would still place some value on both items. The parties can mutually benefit by allocating
the lean to Jack and the fat to his wife rather than the reverse, but both would still prefer-
and presumably try to capture during bargaining-both the fat and the lean.
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better performance, measured by a more desirable settlement
figure.99
Although there are no experimental studies demonstrating that
litigant aspirations affect settlement negotiation outcomes, some stud-
ies claim that aspiration levels can have an effect on bargaining out-
comes generally. It is important to examine the aspirations and
bargaining literature cautiously, however. Experimenters sometimes
claim to be studying parties' "aspirations" or "goals" when their meth-
odology reveals instead that the study concerns the effects of reserva-
tion prices-and not ideal targets-on bargaining outcomes. 100 For
example, in some studies the experimenters assign bargaining goals
and tell subjects that they may not accept any offer inferior to their
goal."" Thus, although the studies claim to measure the effect of ne-
gotiator "goals" or "aspirations," these terms are effectively defined as
the subject's reservation price for reaching a negotiated agreement. By
then demonstrating that subjects with higher "aspirations" achieve
99 See Vandra L. Huber & Margaret A. Neale, Effects of Self- and Competitor Goals on
Performance in an Interdependent Bargaining Task, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 197, 197 (1987)
(questioning whether research on the effect of goals in independent tasks is directly appli-
cable to the interdependent task of bargaining).
lO This is not to say that the authors of such articles are bad scholars or use sloppy
empirical methods. Rather, this confusion demonstrates that the terms "aspirations" and
"goals" are somewhat vague and subject to different meanings. Cf Richard L. Oliver et al.,
Outcome Satisfaction in Negotiation: A Test of Expectancy Disconfirmation, 60 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 252, 257-58 (1994) (discussing the different meanings
attributed to the word "aspirations" in the negotiation literature). As explained in the
Introduction, I use the term "aspiration" to mean a party's ideal goal, and I assume that
aspiration levels are subject to negotiator choice, at least within reason. Logic does suggest
that aspiration levels must bear some loose relation to the objective strength of the negotia-
tor's position, since it would be meaningless to say, for example, that a consumer aspires to
purchase a new car for $1. Cf Blount et al., supra note 13, at 2 (defining an aspiration as
the best outcome a negotiator can reasonably expect); Sally Blount White & Margaret A.
Neale, The Role of Negotiator Aspirations and Settlement Expectancies in Bargaining Outcomes, 57
ORGANIZATIONAL BEIAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 303, 304-05 (1994) (same); Van
Poucke & Buelens, supra note 87, at 68 ("A negotiation target or aspiration price is the best
result, the most desired outcome, with a non-neglectable probability of being accepted by
the other party.").
101 See, e.g., Vandra L. Huber & Margaret A. Neale, Effects of Cognitive Heuristics and
Goals on Negotiator Performance and Subsequent Goal Setting, 38 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 342, 349 (1986) (subjects instructed not to accept any deal with
total profits less than a certain amount); Huber & Neale, supra note 99, at 200 (subjects
instructed that it was against company policy to accept any transaction that did not meet
the assigned goal); Melvin J. Kimmel et al., Effects of Trust, Aspiration, and Gender on Negotia-
tion Tactics, 38J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 9, 11 (1980) (subjects assigned low or high
"aspiration" limits, below which they were not allowed to negotiate an agreement); Mar-
garet A. Neale & Max H. Bazerman, The Effect of Externally Set Goals on Reaching Integrative
Agreements in Competitive Markets, 6 J. OCCUPATIONAL BEHAV. 19, 25 (1985) (subjects in-
structed not to accept any deal with total profits of less than a certain amount); Gregory B.
Northcraft et al., Joint Effects of Assigned Goals and Training on Negotiator Performance, 7 HUM.
PERFORMANCE 257, 264 (1994) (subjects instructed that it was "against company policy" to
accept any agreement less than the assigned goal).
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better negotiated outcomes than subjects with lower "aspirations"
(holding constant a goal of the opponent sufficient to create a bar-
gaining zone when paired with either the high- or low-aspiration sub-
ject), the studies in fact substantiate that subjects with higher
reservation prices achieve better outcomes than subjects with lower reser-
vation prices.102
This result is consistent with the standard model of settlement,
and, more importantly, does not suggest a need to modify the stan-
dard model to account for the finding. Because no party will accept a
deal for less than her reservation price, the standard model implicitly
suggests both that negotiators will "aspire" to achieve at least their res-
ervation price, and that reservation prices in turn affect outcomes,
with subjects who have higher reservation prices achieving better out-
comes than subjects with lower reservation prices, assuming there is a
bargaining zone available to both subject groups. 0 3 The bargaining
zone for high-reservation price subjects is smaller than the bargaining
zone for low-reservation price subjects, and the portion of the bargain-
ing zone that is available to the latter group but not to the former is
the portion that is relatively less desirable for the negotiator.
Other studies demonstrate, however, that negotiation goals that
exceed a party's reservation price can also affect bargaining outcomes.
Sidney Siegel and Lawrence Fouraker assigned subjects either a high
aspiration of obtaining a $6.10 profit or a low aspiration of obtaining a
$2.10 profit in a negotiation.10 4 Subjects were told that they could
keep any amount of profit they were able to negotiate, thus implicitly
suggesting that subjects had a reservation price of $0, regardless of
their aspiration level. 10 5 The experimenters found that high-aspira-
tion subjects negotiated more-profitable agreements than did low-as-
piration subjects,10 6 and they concluded from this result that
aspiration levels are an important determinant of bargaining
payoffs.1 0 7
102 See, e.g., Huber & Neale, supra note 101, at 358-59 (finding that negotiators con-
strained by difficult profit goals outperform negotiators under weaker constraints); Huber
& Neale, supra note 99, at 200 (finding that average profits of negotiators assigned difficult
goals were higher than those of negotiators assigned easy or moderate goals); Kimmel et
al., supra note 101, at 14 (finding that negotiators with higher "aspirations" made more
valuable initial offers and had a higher level of information exchange compared with low-
"aspiration" negotiators); Neale & Bazerman, supra note 101, at 27 (finding a direct, posi-
tive relationship between goal difficulty and performance, as measured by average profit);
Northcraft et al., supra note 101, at 266-67 (finding subjects with specific, difficult goals
achieved higher profit per agreement).
103 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1793-94.
104 See SIDNEY SIEGEL & LAWRENCE E. FOURAKER, BARGAINING AND GROUP DECISION MAK-
INC 64 (1960).
105 See id.
106 Id. at 67, 68 tbl.4.5.
107 Id. at 69-70.
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In addition to keeping any profit that they negotiated, Siegel and
Fouraker's subjects were told that they would have the opportunity to
earn additional profit in a subsequent negotiation if and only if they
achieved their aspiration level.' 08 This instruction introduces a dis-
continuous external benefit at the aspiration point. That is, a bargain
for a $6.00 profit by a subject in the high aspiration group has a value
merely ten cents greater than a $5.90 profit, but a $6.10 profit has an
effective value that is more than ten cents greater than a $6.00 profit.
Thus there is a spiked increase in the financial value that accompanies
an agreement at the aspiration level relative to an agreement for just
less than the aspiration level. Siegel and Fouraker hypothesized (but
did not test the hypothesis) that this discontinuity might have moti-
vated subjects to reach the aspiration levels, 10 9 thus raising the ques-
tion of whether aspiration levels that did not provide such a
discontinuous profit motive would have had the same effect.
Recent studies appear to resolve this question in favor of the con-
clusion that aspirations can affect bargaining outcomes even if achiev-
ing them does not result in a discontinous external benefit. Sally
Blount White and Margaret Neale provided experimental subjects
with both reservation prices and (more optimistic) aspirations, and
instructed them to negotiate the hypothetical sale of a house. 110 "Buy-
ers" were told their reservation price was $235,000, and "Sellers" were
told their reservation price was $225,000, thus establishing a $10,000
bargaining zone."' Some of the Buyers were told their aspiration
price was $220,000 (low aspiration group), and others were told their
aspiration price was $200,000 (high aspiration group). 112 Some of the
Sellers were told their aspiration price was $240,000 (low aspiration
group), others $260,000 (high aspiration group). 1 3 Thus, when
negotiators were randomly assigned opponents, four types of pairings
were possible: (1) low-aspiration Buyer vs. high-aspiration Seller; (2)
low-aspiration Seller vs. high-aspiration Buyer; (3) low-aspiration
Seller vs. low-aspiration Buyer; and (4) high-aspiration Buyer vs. high-
aspiration Seller.
For type #1 pairings, the average sale price negotiated was
$232,664.14 For type #2 pairings, the average sale price was
$227,921.115 For type #3 and type #4 pairings, the average sales prices
108 Id. at 65.
109 id. at 66.
110 Blount White & Neale, supra note 100, at 309.
III See id.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 311 tbl.1.
1'5 Id.
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fell between the other two averages.1 16 Thus, the results suggest that
high aspirations are correlated with better bargaining outcomes.
Other studies provide support for Blount White and Neale's find-
ings. In a companion study using a similar methodology, Blount
White and her coauthors found that when negotiators were provided
reservation prices and aspiration levels, aspiration levels had an im-
pact on outcomes that fell just short of statistical significance. 117 This
suggests that the effect of aspirations on outcomes is real, but that it
can be overshadowed when the negotiator is exposed to numerous
competing stimuli.1 18 In a later study, Jeffrey Polzer and Neale found
that experimental subjects given a "do-your-best" instruction in a ne-
gotiation exercise achieved better results than did subjects given a spe-
cific goal that at first appeared difficult to achieve but was actually
quite easy to achieve. 119 This suggests that aspirations that are in fact
modest lead to relatively undesirable outcomes and, by inference, that
aggressive aspirations lead to more-desirable outcomes. Recently,
Adam Galinsky and coauthors provided subjects with a reservation
price and a much higher target price and told them to either (1) fo-
cus their attention on their target price, or (2) focus on their reserva-
tion price. 120 In subsequent negotiations, subjects given the former
instruction achieved better outcomes than did subjects given the latter
instruction.1 2 1 Although technically all subjects in these experiments
were given identical target prices, the instructions can be understood
as advising half to aspire to those high targets and the other half to
aspire to the much lower reservation price.
Although the experimental results described above strongly sug-
gest that aspirations play a role in determining bargaining outcomes,
they provide no insight into the mechanism or mechanisms by which
aspiration levels might have this effect. In other words, the observa-
tion that high aspirations appear to be associated with better out-
comes does not explain how aspirations affect the judgment or
behavior of negotiators in ways that lead to such results.
116 Id.
117 See Sally Blount White et al., Alternative Models of Price Behavior in Dyadic Negotiations:
Market Prices, Reservation Prices, and Negotiator Aspirations, 57 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 430, 437-38 (1994).
118 See id. at 438-39 ("When negotiators are faced with multiple sources of information
regarding market prices, reservation prices, and aspirations, the negotiator appears to sim-
plify and allow one reference point to dominate.").
119 Jeffrey T. Polzer & Margaret A. Neale, Constraints or Catalysts? Reexamining Goal
Setting Within the Context of Negotiation, 8 HUM. PERFORMANCE 3, 14-16 (1995).
120 Adam D. Galinsky et al., Disconnecting Negotiated Outcomes and Evaluations: The Role of
Negotiator Focus (Working Paper, 2002).
121 Id. at 11-22.
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B. Explanations of the Power of Aspirations
Negotiation scholars within the legal community routinely advise
their readers that negotiators with high aspirations tend to obtain
more-beneficial bargaining outcomes. 122 Although the implication
that aspirations drive bargaining is quite clear, explanations as to why
this would be the case are usually less so-if they are attempted at all.
When negotiation scholars do attempt to explain why aspirations
matter, the most familiar claim is that negotiators with high aspira-
tions achieve desirable bargaining outcomes because they ask for
more at the bargaining table. Consider, for example, the advice pro-
vided by two leading scholars of legal negotiation. Robert Mnookin
and coauthors counsel negotiators about the role of aspirations as
follows:
It's not enough simply to think about your reservation value-the
least you would accept. In your preparation, it is critical that you
aspire to an outcome that serves your interests much better than
your best alternative. You generally won't get what you don't ask
for. Much research has shown that those negotiators with high aspi-
rations on average do better.123
Charles Craver similarly counsels that "people who enter negotia-
tions with high aspiration levels generally obtain more-beneficial re-
sults than those who do not begin with elevated expectations. It thus
behooves bargainers to commence their interactions with high de-
mands or low offers."'124
Craver clearly advocates a particular bargaining strategy-making
high (or extreme) demands. By observing that " [y]ou generally won't
get what you don't ask for,"125 Mnookin and his coauthors appear to
be doing the same. Although this might be sound advice for bargain-
ers, 216 following this strategy does not require the negotiator to have
any particular aspiration level. Negotiators with low aspirations can
make extreme demands or offers just as easily as can negotiators with
high aspirations.
122 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 87.
123 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 34. For similar claims, see FISHER ET AL., supra
note 98, at 179 ("The best rule of thumb is to be optimistic.... The more you try for, the
more you are likely to get. Studies of negotiation consistently show a strong correlation
between aspiration and result."); URY, supra note 87, at 25 (advising that "low aspirations
tend to be self-fulfilling" because "[w]hat you don't ask for, the other side is unlikely to
give you").
124 CRAVER, supra note 87, at 171-72.
125 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 34.
126 The claim that extreme initial demands lead to bargaining success is commonly
made. See, e.g., KARRPSS, supra note 87, at 20; Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Opening
Offers and Out-ofCourt Settlement: A Little Moderation May Not Go a Long Way, 10 OHio ST. J.
ON Disp. RESOL. 1, 11-13 (1994) (presenting experimental results showing an increased
likelihood of settlement).
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Perhaps Mnookin and his coauthors, and Craver link aspirations
with levels of demands because they believe that negotiators with high
aspirations will naturally make higher demands than negotiators with
low aspirations-that is, that there is a causal relationship between
aspirations and demands. This is a sensible hypothesis, but even if
true it seems unduly complicated. Rather than claiming that aspira-
tions affect bargaining outcomes (and perhaps advising negotiators to
establish high aspirations), why not instead claim that demands affect
bargaining outcomes (and perhaps advise negotiators to make high
demands)? Unless it is true that negotiators cannot adjust their de-
mands without first adjusting their aspirations-which common expe-
rience suggests is not the case-invoking aspirations seems to be an
unnecessary analytical step for understanding the determinants of
bargaining outcomes.
The claim that demands affect bargaining outcomes-for which
there is also empirical supportl 2 7-is easily accommodated within the
standard model of settlement under either of two distinct lines of rea-
soning. Settlements are possible at any point between the plaintiffs
and defendant's reservation prices because those settlements would
be mutually beneficial to both parties. If a litigant asks for his own
reservation price, he will never achieve a better result than that. Be-
cause the opponent never knows the litigant's reservation price with
certainty, however, if the litigant asks for what he believes to be the
opponent's reservation price, the opponent might agree to that
amount or close to it, fearing that pressing for an amount more desir-
able for him might lead to an impasse. Negotiators are well advised to
ask for what they estimate to be the opponent's reservation price,
rather than asking for their own reservation price.1 2 8 Mnookin and
his coauthors' observation that "[y]ou generally won't get what you
don't ask for"'129 suggests that this reasoning underlies their advice.
In addition, a high demand or a low offer can signal that the
litigant making the offer believes he has a strong case. Because the
opponent's reservation price depends in large part on the litigant's
relative legal entitlements, such a signal can cause the opponent to
lower her reservation price if she is the plaintiff or raise her reserva-
tion price if she is the defendant. Craver's advice is apparently based
on this observation, as he notes that "[b]argainers who can rationally
defend their seemingly excessive opening demands or apparently par-
127 See, e.g., Galinsky et al., supra note 120, at 18 (finding negotiation subjects' first
offers are correlated with final price).
128 See LAX & SEBENIUS, supra note 10, at 132-34; RAIFFA, supra note 10, at 46.
129 MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 34.
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simonious offers may be able to induce careless adversaries to recon-
sider their own preliminary assessments."', 30
Thus, it appears that if aspirations affect settlement only because
they are a determinant of initial demands (though not a necessary
determinant), then there would be no reason to modify the standard
model of settlement to take account of the role of aspirations. It
would be sufficient for the model to take account of the role of initial
offers.
Unlike Mnookin and his coauthors and Craver, Shell provides an
explanation as to why aspirations affect bargaining outcomes in which
aspirations themselves are necessary variables. 131 He proposes the fol-
lowing: if you are a seller and are focused on your reservation price,
you will relax once you receive an offer above that amount, and the
buyer might recognize this relaxation and not increase the offer.1 32 If
you have a higher (but not unrealistic) goal for yourself, however, you
will not relax as soon, thus causing the buyer to increase the offer. 133
Shell's argument is fundamentally dissimilar to the one advanced
by Mnookin and his coauthors and Craver, because he believes that
high aspirations themselves are critical determinants of bargaining
outcomes rather than a behavior that can be exhibited by any negotia-
tor, regardless of her aspiration level.' 34 Shell seems to suggest that
while a negotiator with low aspirations can issue a high demand, the
gap between what she demands and what she would accept (that is,
her reservation price) will become transparent to the opponent dur-
ing the bargaining process. If the negotiator has a high aspiration, on
the other hand, the gap between demand and reservation price will
not be apparent. The aspiration can thus effectively conceal the nego-
tiator's reservation price and help the negotiator to convince her op-
ponent that her reservation price is higher than it actually is. In other
words, Shell hypothesizes that aspiration levels can affect bargaining
outcomes because a negotiator's aspiration can cause a signal to be
sent to the opponent concerning the negotiator's reservation price.
Although Shell's theory is provocative, it is ultimately unsatisfying
because it does not provide an explicit account of why the reservation
130 CRAVER, supra note 87, at 172. Such a response on the part of the offeree might be
fully rational rather than careless. The offeror might, of course, have private information
about the quality of the parties' respective cases. This possibility would cause a rational
offeree to estimate the likelihood that an extreme offer is based on such private informa-
tion (as well as the likelihood that an extreme offer is merely a bluff) and alter his reserva-
tion price accordingly. Cf Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 72, at 105 n.102 (discussing the
informational value of an opening offer in the settlement context).
III See SHELL, supra note 10, at 27-37.
132 See id. at 28.
133 See id. at 28-29.
34 See id. at 32-33 (stating that "[o] ptimistic goals are effective only if they are feasible;
that is, only if [the negotiator] believe[s] in them").
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price of a negotiator with low aspirations would be more transparent
than the reservation price of a negotiator with high aspirations. Hold-
ing reservation prices constant, why would negotiators with high aspi-
rations be able to convince their opponents to concede more ground
than would negotiators with modest aspirations who simply follow the
rational strategy of asking for far more than their reservation price?
Shell's account tells us forcefully that aspirations-notjust demands-
matter, but it falls short of providing a persuasive account of why this
would be so.
Jennifer Brown has come closest to providing a complete theory
of why aspiration levels might have a direct, causal impact on bargain-
ing outcomes. Brown hypothesizes that negotiators derive more util-
ity from each dollar received up to their aspiration level than from
each dollar received beyond their aspiration level. 135 The hypothesis
that negotiators are more driven to achieve their level of aspiration
than to go beyond it relies implicitly on prospect theory's prediction
that individuals are "loss averse," meaning that losses from reference
points have greater utility consequences than do equivalent-sized
gains. 136 If individuals value losses more than equivalent gains, as
prospect theory suggests, perhaps individuals care much more about
"losing" a dollar relative to their aspiration than "gaining" a dollar.
This, in turn, might cause negotiators to fight harder to reach their
aspiration than to exceed it.137
The intellectual roots of Brown's hypothesis can be traced to an
argument advanced by Siegel and Fouraker in 1960, nearly two de-
cades before prospect theory was formally proposed by Kahneman
and Tversky.138 According to Siegel and Fouraker, the level of aspira-
tion of any individual negotiator "may be conceived as a position on
the individual's utility function. ' 139 Negotiators evaluate settlement
proposals from the reference point of their utility function. 140 Devia-
tions down from their aspiration level are perceived as losses, entailing
feelings of dissatisfaction, while deviations above their aspiration level
are perceived as gains, giving the negotiator a psychological feeling of
satisfaction. 1 41 The goal point that has the largest difference in utility
between it and the next-lower goal is the negotiator's level of aspira-
135 See Brown, supra note 87, at 1669-73.
136 See Heath et al., supra note 3, at 82 ("Outcomes that are encoded as losses are more
painful than similar sized gains are pleasurable .... ); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICr RESOLUTION 44, 54 (Ken-
neth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995) (discussing "loss aversion," which posits that "losses gener-
ally loom larger than the corresponding gains").
137 See Brown, supra note 87, at 1671.
138 See SIEGEL & FoURAKER, supra note 104, at 61-70.
139 Id. at 61-62.
140 See id.
141 Id. at 62.
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tion. 14 2 The large difference in utility between these two points en-
courages the negotiator to strive to reach the higher level and avoid
the disappointment of failure. Once the aspiration level is achieved,
the negotiator loses enthusiasm to continue further because the value
of any subsequent level is only marginally better than the level the
negotiator has reached.1 43
Siegel and Fouraker, as well as Brown, specifically predict that
aspiration levels will affect whether negotiators perceive certain poten-
tial settlements as gains or losses. t 44 This in itself is an important hy-
pothesis, but the authors' work provides an even more valuable
general hypothesis: aspirations might serve as reference points,
against which negotiators might compare possible settlements on a
range of dimensions.1 45 Differences in aspirations might therefore
lead to differences in negotiators' subjective evaluation of settlement
proposals,1 46 and thus lead to different bargaining behavior.
Part III builds on this insight to create a detailed theory of how
aspirations can affect settlement outcomes in multiple ways by serving
as reference points for negotiator judgments and choices, and how
the standard model of settlement bargaining can be modified to take
account of aspirations.
III
THE REFERENCE POINT THEORY OF ASPIRATIONS
From one perspective, the omission of the concept of aspirations
from the standard model of settlement is understandable. The law-
and-economics, "rational choice" perspective on settlement behavior
implicitly suggests that aspirations-at least to the extent that they are
independent from identified settlement levers-should have no effect
on bargaining outcomes. A "rational" litigant determines his reserva-
tion price by reference to his options should settlement negotiations
fail. Thus, he must take into account the expected value, transaction
costs, and risks associated with adjudication.1 47 Regardless of his aspi-
ration, the litigant should seek the most beneficial settlement agree-
142 Id.
143 See id.
144 See id.; Brown, supra note 87, at 1670-71.
145 Cf Heath et al., supra note 3, at 79 ("Our claim is that goals serve as reference
points and systematically alter the value of outcomes .... ").
146 Cf Terry L. Boles & David M. Messick, A Reverse Outcome Bias: The Influence of Multi-
ple Reference Points on the Evaluation of Outcomes and Decisions, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 262, 262 (1995) ("It has been known at least since the time of
Shakespeare that the evaluation of a stimulus depends not only on the characteristics of
the stimulus itself but also on the referent or standard that is brought to bear in the evalua-
tion process.").
147 See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 12, at 1795-96 (describing the relationship between a
litigant's reservation price and the prospects, costs, and risks of adjudication).
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ment possible but ultimately favor any final offer that is superior to his
reservation price. During bargaining he might decline a settlement
proposal that is superior to his reservation price, but only if his esti-
mates of his opponent's reservation price or of the parties' relative
costs of delay suggest that the potential benefits of doing so outweigh
the risks.
The law-and-behavioral-science literature that modifies the law-
and-economics approach suggests that litigants' analyses might de-
pend on their role, 148 that their risk preferences might be context
dependent, 49 and that they might value fair treatment in addition to
the monetary benefits of settlement. 50 None of these modifications,
however, undermines the law-and-economics intuition that aspirations
have no relevance to the settlement dynamic.
The persistence of the conventional negotiation wisdom that aspi-
rations do affect outcomes, along with the empirical support for that
proposition, however, suggest that legal scholars should evaluate
whether the descriptive accuracy of the standard model of settlement
can be improved by modifying it to take account of the role of aspira-
tions. Modifying the standard model to take aspirations into account,
however, requires a theory of the mechanisms by which aspirations
operate. This Part presents a general theory of how aspirations affect
the outcome of settlement negotiations (the "reference point theory
of aspirations"), offers a series of specific hypotheses that follow from
the theory, and then presents experimental evidence that supports
the hypotheses.
The reference point theory of aspirations has two components:
(1) aspirations affect settlement outcomes indirectly by affecting vari-
ables identified by the standard model as settlement levers; (2) aspira-
tions affect settlement levers by acting as cognitive reference points
that "anchor" negotiator judgments and "frame" negotiator choices.
A specific (but non-exclusive) list of hypotheses that follow from
the theory includes the following:
1. A litigant's aspiration level will affect his determination of his
reservation price when the value of adjudication is uncertain.
2. A litigant's aspiration level will affect the likelihood that he will
perceive a particular settlement offer to be fair.
3. A litigant's aspiration level will affect his patience at the bargain-
ing table.
4. An opponent's aspiration level, if known to the litigant, will af-
fect the litigant's patience at the bargaining table.
148 See, e.g., supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
149 See, e.g., supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
150 See, e.g., supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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5. A litigant's aspiration level will affect his willingness to risk an
impasse in an effort to obtain a more desirable settlement.
The experimental results, described in this Part, are consistent
with these hypotheses and provide cautious support for the theory
that aspirations can affect settlement negotiation outcomes by affect-
ing settlement levers.
A. The Elements of the Reference Point Theory
In any particular settlement bargaining situation, the values of
the relevant "settlement levers" are determined by the negotiators.
That is, negotiator agency is an essential assumption of the standard
model. Such determinations have two components: the negotiators'
judgments about facts, and the negotiators' personal preferences. For
example, a negotiator's reservation price is based on her prediction
concerning the likely trial outcome (a judgment) and her aversion to
risk (a preference). If an aspiration can affect the negotiator's judg-
ments or preferences, it can affect one or more settlement levers and
thus indirectly affect settlement outcomes.
Borrowing from the psychological literature on judgment and de-
cision making, the reference point theory of aspirations posits that
aspirations can affect settlement decision making via two mechanisms:
aspirations can serve as cognitive anchors that bias relevant judg-
ments, and aspirations can serve as cognitive frames that affect rele-
vant preferences. The theory proposes that both of these mechanisms
operate because negotiators refer to their aspirations when making
such judgments and forming such preferences.
1. Aspirations as Anchors
Psychologists have long recognized that, when making judgments
under conditions of uncertainty, individuals often begin with a refer-
ence value, and then adjust from that point to arrive at their final
determination. 151 What makes this process, known as "anchoring and
adjustment," 152 particularly interesting is that the anchor value need
not bear a rational relationship to the item subject to valuation, and
the adjustment made to the anchor value is usually insufficient to ac-
count for the difference between the anchor value and the item's true
value. 153 In other words, judgments affected by anchors will often dif-
151 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974); Glen Whyte & James K. Sebenius, The Effect
of Multiple Anchors on Anchoring in Individual and Group Judgment, 69 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 75, 75 (1997).
152 MAx H. BAZERMAN & MARGARET A. NEALE, NEGOTIATING RATIONALLY 23-30 (1992).
153 See, e.g., id. at 25; Blount et al., supra note 13, at 3-4; Whyte & Sebenius, supra note
151, at 75-76. Some authors even define an anchor as a referent that is logically irrelevant
to the subject of the valuation. See, e.g., Kahneman, supra note 62, at 308 ("Anchoring
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fer from judgments made consistent with strict predictions of rational
choice theory. 154
In one well-known example of this phenomenon, experimenters
asked one group of professional auditors (Group A) whether they be-
lieved management fraud occurred in more than 10 of every 1000
companies audited by major accounting firms, and they asked another
group of auditors (Group B) selected from the same general pool
whether they believed such fraud occurred in more than 200 out of
every 1000 companies audited. 5 5 They then asked subjects in both
groups to estimate the number of such companies per 1000 that have
significant management fraud. 5 6 Group A subjects estimated an aver-
age of 16.52 incidents of fraud per 1000 companies, while Group B
subjects estimated an average of 43.11 incidents of fraud per 1000.157
Presumably, the difference in average responses was due to the differ-
ent anchors (10 versus 200) to which the subject groups were
exposed.
Research suggests that anchors probably bias judgments by in-
creasing the accessibility of information that is consistent with the
anchor. 15 8 For example, Group A subjects in the auditor fraud experi-
ment, who were exposed to the lower anchor, might have more easily
been able to access information consistent with the belief that the
fraud rate is low than could Group B subjects, who were exposed to
the higher anchor.
Just as the content of the initial question posed to the auditor
subjects apparently anchored the subjects' estimates of management
fraud, a negotiator's pre-negotiation aspiration level could conceiva-
bly anchor judgments that she must make in order to establish various
settlement levers. For example, aspirations might anchor judgments
necessary to establish reservation prices and to determine what settle-
ment values would be fair and thus acceptable.
2. Aspirations as Frames
Prospect theory predicts that the utility consequence of options
depends not only on the absolute value of those options, but also on
effects will be explained as cases in which a stimulus or a message that is clearly designated
as irrelevant and uninformative nevertheless increases the normality of a possible
outcome.").
154 Cf Whyte & Sebenius, supra note 151, at 76 ("[R]eliance on a given anchor may
depend on factors other than normative appropriateness.").
155 Edward J. Joyce & Gary C. Biddle, Anchoring and Adjustment in Probabilistic Inference
in Auditing, 19J. Accr. REs. 120, 122-23 (1981).
156 Id.
157 Id. at 125.
158 See, e.g., Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Comparing Is Believing: A Selective Accessi-
bility Model of Judgmental Anchoring, 10 EUR. Rav. Soc. PSYCHOL. 135, 144-57 (1999).
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whether the options represent a "gain" or a "loss" relative to some
external reference point.159 While classical rational choice theory
leads to the prediction that two plaintiffs who obtain a settlement that
is $10,000 greater than their reservation prices should be equally
pleased (because the absolute value of their transaction relative to
their alternatives is the same), prospect theory allows for the possibil-
ity that the utility consequences of such a settlement could vary de-
pending on the reference point the litigants use as the basis for
evaluating the transaction. 16 Because utility depends on whether the
prospect is framed as a gain or loss, this implication of prospect theory
is often called the "framing effect."161
Whether prospect theory and rational choice theory would pre-
dict different levels of satisfaction for a particular litigant depends on
the litigant's reference point. A natural reference point for framing
prospects is the status quo state of the world, or the individual's cur-
rent position. In litigation, this position is represented by the liti-
gant's reservation price, because the reservation price reflects the
expected value of the right to an adjudicated outcome, which he cur-
rently possesses. If the litigant uses his reservation price as the refer-
ence point for judging settlement proposals, any larger amount for a
plaintiff (or smaller for a defendant) will be evaluated as a satisfying
"gain," while any smaller amount for a plaintiff (or larger for a defen-
dant) will be evaluated as an unsatisfying "loss." If litigants use their
reservation prices-and only their reservation prices-as reference
points, rational choice theory and prospect theory would both predict
that a settlement superior to litigants' reservation prices would gener-
ate positive utility that varies according to how superior the settlement
is. Likewise, both theories would predict that settlements inferior to
litigants' reservation prices would generate negative utility that varies
according to the inferiority of the settlement.
It is possible, however, that litigants might reference their aspira-
tion levels when evaluating settlement proposals or, alternatively, ref-
erence a combination of reservation price and aspiration level. In
either case, prospect theory and rational choice theory would predict
different utility consequences for particular settlement proposals. Any
particular settlement proposal is more likely to fall short of a high
aspiration level than a low aspiration level. Thus, if a litigant evaluates
a settlement in reference to his aspiration level, prospect theory leads
159 See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 61, at 277-80; Tversky & Kahneman, supra
note 61, at S257-59.
160 Cf Heath et al., supra note 3, at 84 ("One of the most basic aspects of motivation is
that people do not see outcomes as neutral, but categorize them as a success or failure and
then they experience positive or negative emotion based on their categorization.").
161 See Kahneman, supra note 62, at 297-98; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 61, at
S257-62.
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to the prediction that a high aspiration will increase the likelihood
that any particular settlement proposal will be viewed as unsatisfying
rather than satisfying.
To test this intuition derived from prospect theory, a group of
subjects (n = 23) was given the following description ("Arnold and
Charles") of two settlement negotiations in which the plaintiffs had
identical reservation prices and reached identical bargaining out-
comes but had different aspiration levels:
Arnold sues Ben. Arnold will settle out of court for any dollar
amount greater than $5000 rather than bear the expense of a trial.
His goal is to obtain at least $10,000. After negotiating with Ben,
Arnold agrees to accept a settlement of $15,000.
Charles sues Donald. Charles will settle out-of-court for any dollar
amount greater than $5000 rather than bear the expense of a trial.
His goal is to obtain at least $20,000. After negotiating with Donald,
Charles agrees to accept a $15,000 settlement.162
Subjects were then asked whether they believed Arnold would be
happier with his outcome than Charles, Charles would be happier
with his outcome than Arnold, or whether the two would be equally
happy with their outcomes. Twenty-one subjects said Arnold would be
happier than Charles, none said Charles would be happier than Ar-
nold, and only two said the plaintiffs would be equally happy. The
results are sharply different than what rational choice theory would
predict1 63 -after all, each plaintiff received $10,000 more than his res-
ervation price-but consistent with the hypothesis that aspiration
levels can affect the frame through which litigants view settlements,
and thus can affect utility.
Even if aspirations can affect post-settlement satisfaction, how-
ever, it does not necessarily follow that aspirations will affect actual
settlement negotiation outcomes. Assuming that Arnold would be
happier with a $15,000 settlement than Charles would be, Charles
would not necessarily be less likely to accept a $15,000 settlement of-
fer. The effect of aspirations on satisfaction can conceivably affect
outcomes, however, if that effect can influence litigants' preferences
in ways that impact settlement levers.
Recall that prospect theory predicts not only that the utility con-
sequences of prospects depend on whether they are framed as gains
or losses, but also that losses are more painful than equivalent gains
162 For a more detailed description of the subjects and experiment methodology, see
infra note 165 and accompanying text.
163 Compared to either the prediction that subjects would believe the plaintiffs would
be equally happy with their outcomes, or that the same number of subjects would have
believed each plaintiff would be happier, p = .00.
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FIGURE 1: ARNOLD AND CHARLES
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are pleasurale. 1 64 This suggests that litigants might be willing to ex-
ert more energy and accept greater risks to avoid the dissatisfaction of
a loss than they would to capture the satisfaction of an equivalent
gain. If so, aspiration levels could conceivably affect settlement levers
such as patience and the willingness to risk impasse.
B. Testing the Reference Point Theory
1. Experimental Methodology
I investigated the plausibility of the reference point theory of as-
pirations by identifying a series of specific, testable hypotheses and
then testing these hypotheses experimentally. Subjects for the experi-
ments were 187 second- and third-year law students at the UC[A
School of Law. The majority of the subjects (164) were recruited in
two Business Associations classes; the remainder (23) participated as
part of a Negotiation class.165 None of the subjects received compen-
sation for his or her participation.
The subjects received an instruction sheet that described the ex-
periment as "part of a research study investigating how lawyers and
164 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
165 The Negotiation students participated in the experiments during the first week of
the class, prior to being exposed to any discussion of aspirations, and without any discus-
sion of the purpose of the experiments. Thus, these subjects were no more educated on
the relevant issues than their peers recruited in the Business Associations classes.
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law students think about issues that arise in negotiations concerning
lawsuits and potential lawsuits." They were further instructed that
they would be asked to read several scenarios and to respond to one
or two questions after each scenario; that there were no "right an-
swers" to any of the questions; that no outside knowledge of the law
was necessary; that their responses would not be individually identi-
fied; and that participation was voluntary. 66 The subjects completed
their responses in the presence of the experimenter.
Each subject responded to three or four hypothetical scenarios
describing a different litigation situation. Each scenario explained
that the subject was the lawyer representing either the plaintiff or de-
fendant. The scenario described the basic facts of the lawsuit, told the
subjects that they were engaged in (or about to engage in) settlement
negotiations with the opposing party's lawyer, and informed the sub-
jects about their aspiration in the bargaining. With some exceptions
described below (such as when the scenario tested whether aspiration
levels would affect reservation prices), subjects were also informed
about their reservation price, or "bottom line." When subjects were to
play the role of a plaintiff's lawyer, their aspirations were higher than
their reservation price (that is, more than the minimum they were
willing to accept to settle out of court); when subjects were asked to
play the role of a defendant's lawyer, their aspirations were lower than
their reservation price (that is, less than the maximum amount they
would pay to settle out of court). After reading each scenario, the
subjects were asked to answer one question relevant to a settlement
lever. Some of the questions required subjects to choose from several
answer choices, while others were open-ended.
With one exception (described below), each scenario was
presented in two or more versions. A single variable, usually the sub-
ject's settlement aspiration, was manipulated between versions. Con-
clusions were drawn by comparing the mean response of subjects who
responded to one version of a scenario with the mean response of
subjects who responded to a different version of the same scenario,
using an independent samples t-test. The different versions of each
scenario were assigned randomly and the ordering of the scenarios
was also randomized to insure, to the extent possible, that differences
in mean responses to different versions of the scenarios were due
solely to the effect of the variable manipulated between versions,
rather than to differences in subject pools or to ordering effects.
166 In each of the Business Associations classes, a small number of students declined to
participate. The students who so declined are not included in the subject count.
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2. Hypotheses and Results
a. Anchoring Reservation Prices
The plaintiff's reservation price represents the amount at which
she is indifferent between settling the case out of court and litigating
her claim. In other words, her reservation price is the value she places
on her right to seek adjudication of her claim. According to the stan-
dard model, a litigant's reservation price should thus depend on her
estimate of the expected value of litigating the claim to adjudication,
the relative costs of litigation and settlement, her risk preference, the
emotional costs of trial, and so forth, but it should not depend on an
aspiration level determined exogenously to these variables. In reality,
however, the factors that logically should inform the plaintiff's reser-
vation price are often difficult to assess and fraught with uncertainty,
making the normative determination of a reservation price in accor-
dance with the standard model difficult. Given this practical diffi-
culty, a plaintiff might base her reservation price, at least in part, on
information that is not logically relevant from a normative
perspective. 16 7
Hypothesis #1 posits that, when establishing a reservation price is
difficult because the value of adjudication is uncertain, litigants might
rely on their aspiration, which is much easier to establish than a reser-
vation price, as an anchor value for determining their reservation
price. 168 Thus, plaintiffs with high aspirations will tend to establish
higher reservation prices, on average, than plaintiffs with low
aspirations.
Experimental subjects were presented with a litigation scenario
("Landlord-Tenant") notable for the uncertainty surrounding the ex-
pected value of the plaintiff's legal claim should the case be resolved
in court. Subjects were provided with information about the dispute
and a settlement negotiation aspiration, and then asked to set their
own reservation price. Subjects receiving Version A (low aspiration)
were provided the following information:
You have agreed to represent a friend in a dispute she is having with
her landlord. Last winter, the heater in your friend's apartment in
California went out. First, the landlord was out of town. Then the
landlord claimed nothing was wrong with the heater. After that, the
landlord sent his brother-in-law to repair the heater, but the
brother-in-law didn't really fix it properly. Finally, the landlord sent
a professional repairman. By the time the heater was finally work-
167 Cf Whyte & Sebenius, supra note 151, at 79-81 tbls.1-2, 4-5 (finding that an irrele-
vant numerical anchor affected the "bottom line" of negotiating subjects, "even though
more appropriate anchors were available").
168 Cf BAZERMAN & NEALE, supra note 152, at 28 (claiming that goals can become
anchors for negotiators).
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ing properly, it was three months after your friend initially reported
the problem. Although the winter was moderate and the lack of
heat not life-threatening, your friend was uncomfortable for a good
portion of the winter. Your friend pays $1000 per month rent.
You have threatened to file a lawsuit against the landlord in small
claims court. Legally, the landlord is obligated to provide heat, and
his failure to do so, if proven, entitles your friend to a rebate of
some portion of her rent during the period that the heater did not
work. Because there is a small chance you would lose in small
claims court (the landlord claims the heater was never broken), the
size of the award you would win is uncertain (the amount is com-
pletely subject to the judge's discretion and there is no available
information on the size of past judgments), and small claims court
is a hassle, you would prefer to reach a negotiated settlement with
the landlord. However, if a settlement is not possible, you are not
afraid to go through with the lawsuit. Prior to meeting with the
landlord, you have set as your goal to settle the matter for at least
$750.
What will be the least amount of money you will accept to settle the
case out of small claims court-that is, your "bottom line" in your
negotiations with the landlord? (Note: you will not reveal your bot-
tom line to the landlord).
Version B of the scenario (high aspiration) was identical, except
that the last sentence of the second paragraph read:
Prior to meeting with the landlord, you have set as your goal to
settle the matter for at least $2000.
Version A subjects (n = 18) provided an average reservation price
of $608, while Version B (n = 18) subjects provided an average reserva-
tion price of $1097, a highly significant difference. 69 The results sup-
port Hypothesis #1-that when litigants enter settlement negotiations
with a defined aspiration level but without a clear, independently cal-
culated reservation price, the aspiration level can significantly influ-
ence the litigant's effective reservation price. When this happens, a
litigant with a high aspiration level would face a bargaining zone that
is smaller and skewed more favorably than would a litigant with the
same legal claim but a lower aspiration level.
One possible objection to drawing this conclusion from the com-
parison between Version A and Version B subjects is that Version A
subjects may have provided lower reservation prices than they actually
would have in a real negotiation because they were logically con-
strained by the low aspiration level provided to them. Version A sub-
jects might have wished to establish higher reservation prices, but felt
obligated by the experiment to provide reservation prices below $750,
169 p = .00.
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since the aspiration level of $750 made it logically necessary that their
reservation price be no higher than this amount.
To insure that the difference in reservation prices between Ver-
sion A and B subjects was not caused entirely by such a "ceiling ef-
fect"1 70 that the scenario imposed on Version A subjects, another
group of subjects was provided Version C of the scenario. Version C
was identical to the other two versions, except that it omitted the final
sentence of the second paragraph entirely, thus providing no specific
aspiration level. Version C subjects provided an average reservation
price of $892, higher than that provided by Version A subjects, but
still significantly less than the $1097 provided by Version B subjects.1 7 1
FIGURE 2: LANDLORD-TENANT
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The comparison between Versions B and C has two implications.
First, the results suggest that the difference between the reservation
prices set by Version A and B subjects was probably not entirely caused
by the fact that Version A subjects could not logically have presented a
reservation price higher than their aspiration of $750. When a litigant
cannot easily assess his reservation price with certainty, it seems likely
that a higher aspiration will lead to a higher reservation price than will
170 A "ceiling effect" results when subject achievement, or in this particular case sub-
ject responses, are so constrained that some subjects "top out." See, e.g., CLIFFORD J. DREW
ET AL., DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING RESEARCI-I: INQUIRY IN EDUCATION AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
295 (1996).
171 p = .02.
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a lower aspiration. Second, the results also suggest that litigants with a
high, clearly defined aspiration level might establish higher reserva-
tion prices than subjects without a clearly defined aspiration level.
The standard model of settlement recognizes that the litigants'
reservation prices are critical determinants of settlement negotiation
outcomes.172 A plaintiff with a relatively high reservation price should
achieve more-desirable settlement outcomes, on average, than a plain-
tiff with a relatively low reservation price, unless the former's reserva-
tion price exceeds that of the defendant but the latter's does not. For
example, assume that the defendant's reservation price in settlement
negotiations is $20,000, and the plaintiffs reservation price is either
$15,000 (high reservation price) or $5000 (low reservation price). For
the high-reservation-price plaintiff, the bargaining zone ranges from
$15,000 to $20,000; for the low-reservation-price plaintiff, the bargain-
ing zone ranges from $5000 to $20,000. Holding other factors con-
stant, the high-reservation-price plaintiff should, on average, achieve
superior bargaining outcomes relative to the low-reservation-price
plaintiff, since the range of possible agreements for the former is
skewed toward higher dollar values.
b. Anchoring Fairness Determinations
The standard model of settlement recognizes that litigants may
reject settlements that are superior to their reservation prices when
they believe that the proposed settlement reflects an unfair or inequi-
table division of the cooperative surplus. 173 Determining what settle-
ment values are or are not fair, however, can be even more difficult
for a litigant than determining his reservation price. While an una-
voidable lack of complete information makes setting a reservation
price subject to error, there is not even a clear benchmark for judging
the fairness of a proposed settlement.
Experimental evidence indicates that judgments about fairness
are often self-serving, as people tend to recall more information and
arguments supportive of their claims than of an opponent's claims.
Loewenstein and his coauthors demonstrated that, in a settlement ne-
gotiation simulation, "plaintiff' subjects not only provided higher esti-
mates of the expected value of the plaintiff's claim than did
"defendant" subjects, but "plaintiff' subjects also believed that a much
higher settlement amount would be the fairest result of the negotia-
tions than did "defendant" subjects. 174
If litigants invoke their aspirations as reference points against
which they judge the fairness of a potential settlement, then high aspi-
172 See discussion supra Part I.A.1.
173 See discussion supra Part I.B.2.
174 See Loewenstein et al., supra note 56, at 150, 151 tbl.2.
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rations might cause or, alternatively, might reinforce self-serving as-
sessments of fairness. Thus, Hypothesis #2 is that litigants with high
aspirations will be more likely than litigants with low aspirations to
believe that a given potential settlement is unfair.
To test this hypothesis, subjects were given a scenario ("Age Dis-
crimination") that asked them to play the role of the plaintiffs lawyer
in a lawsuit in which some facts favored the position of each side, the
plaintiff was seeking a specific award, and the plaintiff had established
a relatively low reservation price. Version A subjects (low aspiration)
received the following information:
You represent Henry Smith in an employment discrimination law-
suit against his former employer. Two years ago, Smith was fired by
his employer, Electec Corporation, after 18 years of employment in
a middle management position. Smith is now happily employed in
a similar position in another company at the same salary level, but it
took him a full year to find his new job. Smith recently filed a law-
suit against Electec claiming age discrimination and seeking dam-
ages of $75,000-his annual salary of $50,000 for the year he was
unemployed plus $25,000 for emotional damages (he has no inter-
est in getting his old job back). Electec denies the charge and
claims it has no legal liability to Smith.
Smith bases his charge of age discrimination on the following facts:
He was fired almost immediately after he turned 60 years old. All of
his performance evaluations have rated his performance as at least
"very good." All other Electec employees promoted to his level over
the past few years have been under 40 years old, despite the fact that
many other employees eligible for such promotions have been
older. Shortly before he was fired, Electec had been criticized by
Wall Street investment analysts for having high pension liabilities
compared to its competitors.
The company denies Smith's charge of discrimination, pointing to
the following facts: A reduction in business last year forced it to lay
off 10% of its workforce. The 10% was made up of younger and
older employees. Smith's performance evaluations consistently
rated him as "excellent" for his first 14 years with the company, but
his rating has slipped substantially to "very good" for the last 4 years
in a row. Five other employees at Smith's management level were
over 60 years old at the time Smith was fired and are all still em-
ployed by Electec.
You are preparing to meet with Electec's lawyer to try to negotiate
an out-of-court settlement. Given the uncertain outcome of a trial as
well as the costs and distress involved, you have decided that you will
reluctantly accept the best settlement offer you can get, as long as it
is at least $10,000. You have set $25,000 as your negotiating goal-
that is, you will try to convince Electec to pay at least $25,000 to
settle the case.
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Version B subjects (high aspiration) received identical informa-
tion, with the exception that the last sentence of the scenario pro-
vided that the subject's aspiration was $50,000 rather than $25,000.
All subjects were then asked, "What do you think would be a fair
settlement amount in this case?" The answer sheet did not constrain
the range of possible responses, although logically no answer could
exceed $75,000, the amount Henry Smith sought in the lawsuit. Ac-
tual responses ranged from a low of $10,000 to a high of $50,000.
Version A subjects (n = 24)-those with the lower aspiration-re-
sponded, on average, that $25,000 would be a fair settlement amount.
Version B subjects (n = 25)-those with higher aspirations-re-
sponded, on average, that $32,000 would be a fair settlement. The
difference between the subject groups is statistically significant.1 7 5
FIGURE 3: AGE DISCRIMINATION
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Although it is doubtlessly true that many factors are relevant to a
litigant's determination of what settlement outcome or range of out-
comes would be fair under the circumstances, the results support the
hypothesis that aspiration levels might play a role in this calculus. If a
plaintiff believes that a particular settlement or range of settlement
amounts would be unfair and therefore determines she would reject
such settlements, she reduces the size of the bargaining zone, skewing
what remains of the bargaining zone toward higher amounts and thus
175 p = .04.
2002]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
increasing the average desirability of possible settlements. In this way,
the effect of aspirations on perceptions of fairness can operate simi-
larly to the effect of aspirations on the litigant's reservation price: high
aspirations can shrink the effective size of the bargaining zone, skew-
ing possible bargaining outcomes to the advantage of the negotiator
with high aspirations.
c. Framing and Patience
If losses have a greater utility consequence than do equivalent
gains, it follows that individuals who find themselves below their refer-
ence point by a certain amount might choose to exert more effort to
improve their situation than would individuals who find themselves
equal to their reference point or above their reference point by an
equivalent amount. 176 Building on this insight, Hypothesis #3 is that
negotiators will be willing to bargain for longer-to demonstrate
more patience-in an effort to increase the value of an agreement
when a proposed settlement is inferior to their aspiration than when a
proposed settlement is equal to or superior to their aspiration. That
is, although Charles ($20,000 goal) and Arnold ($10,000 goal) might
both prefer a $15,000 settlement to litigating their cases, 177 Charles
would be more willing than Arnold to incur additional bargaining
costs in an attempt to improve the settlement terms due to the greater
differential positive utility he would enjoy if he secured a higher settle-
ment price.
To explore this hypothesis, two subject groups were given a scena-
rio ("Slip and Fall") in which a settlement offer was made that is
equivalent to or more desirable than the subject's reservation price,
but the offer either satisfied or did not satisfy the subject's aspiration.
Version A subjects were told the following:
You represent a supermarket chain named "Henderson's" in litiga-
tion matters. Henderson's has recently been sued by a customer,
Mr. Jones, who slipped on a wet spot on the floor next to the meat
counter in a Henderson's supermarket and suffered a severely bro-
ken hip. Henderson's has an employee mop the floors routinely to
prevent this type of accident, but they occur from time to time
nonetheless. It is unclear whether Henderson's was negligent and
whether Mr. Jones might have been contributorily negligent. The
exact extent of Mr. Jones's damages are also unclear. All of these
176 Cf Heath et al., supra note 3, at 85 ("[L]oss aversion implies that people who are
below their goal by x units ... will work harder to increase their performance by a given
increment than people who are above their goal by x units."). This is also consistent with
the prediction of goal theory that harder goals will increase persistence. See, e.g., Latham &
Locke, supra note 91, at 228.
177 See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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issues would have to be resolved by a jury if the case were to go to
trial.
You met with Mr. Jones's attorney yesterday to try to negotiate a
settlement. Before negotiating, you determined the maximum
amount of money you would pay to settle the case is $30,000 (if you
could not settle the case for $30,000 or less, you would take the case
to trial). You set as your goal to pay no more than $20,000 to settle
the case. After a full day of negotiations, Mr. Jones's lawyer has re-
duced his settlement demand to $30,000 (he originally demanded
far more than that). Although paying that amount would be better
than going to trial, you have scheduled another meeting to con-
tinue your negotiations.
Version B subjects were given identical information, except that they
were told that Mr. Jones's lawyer has reduced his settlement demand
to $20,000 (rather than to $30,000), after originally demanding far
more. Both subject groups were then asked: "How many more hours
will you negotiate with Mr. Jones's attorney in an effort to reduce his
settlement demand before accepting his lowest demand?"
Subjects were required to respond with a number in the range of
"0 hours (accept the $20,000 [$30,000] offer now)," to "10 or more
hours." The mean response varied significantly between the two sub-
ject groups. 178 Version A subjects (n = 12) said, on average, that they
would continue negotiations for 5.4 hours. Version B subjects (n =
11) said, on average, that they would continue negotiations for 2.6
hours.
The results are consistent with Hypothesis #3, which posited that
aspiration levels might affect litigant patience in settlement negotia-
tion. Specifically, litigants whose aspirations have been satisfied might
bargain with less determination and for less time before reaching
agreement than would litigants whose aspirations have not been satis-
fied, even when a settlement superior to their reservation price is ob-
tainable. Because higher aspirations are less likely to be satisfied than
lower aspirations, it follows that higher aspirations might cause in-
creased patience in bargaining.
Although consistent with Hypothesis #3, this experiment is far
from conclusive because it manipulates two variables, rather than one,
between subject groups. Version A subjects' aspiration was not met by
the plaintiff's demand, whereas Version B subjects' aspiration was
met. But Version A subjects also faced a substantively less favorable
demand (because of the higher absolute offer) than did Version B
subjects. Thus, it is possible that Version A subjects said they would
negotiate longer prior to settling because they faced a higher settle-
ment demand, albeit one that satisfied the constraint of their reserva-
178 p = .04.
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tion price, and not because their aspiration had not been satisfied.
For instance, Version A subjects might have inferred that there was
more room between the proposed offer and the opponent's reserva-
tion price than did Version B subjects. If this were true, the difference
between the responses of Version A and Version B subjects would be
attributable to different estimations of the opponent's reservation
price, not to differences in aspiration levels.
If the difference in patience was caused by the different utility
consequences of having one's aspirations satisfied or not satisfied,
however, we would expect a large difference in patience between liti-
gants who face an offer that satisfies their aspiration and those who
face an offer that does not satisfy their aspiration, but a much smaller
difference between litigants who face an offer that minimally satisfies
their aspiration and those who face an offer that substantially exceeds
their aspiration. If the difference in patience was caused by the differ-
ence in the plaintiffs absolute demand, however, we would expect a
more consistent decrease in subject patience as the absolute value of
plaintiff demands decreases.
In an attempt to gain insight into the relative influence of the two
possible causal factors (subject aspirations or plaintiff demands),
three additional subject groups were given a slightly modified version
of the "Slip and Fall" scenario: Versions C, D, and E.
Version C subjects (high demand) were told the following:
Before negotiating, you set as your goal to pay not more than
$20,000 to settle the case out of court (although you would be will-
ing to pay substantially more than that to avoid the costs of a trial,
the risk of an unfavorable jury verdict, and the bad publicity). After
a full day of negotiations, Mr. Jones's lawyer has reduced his settle-
ment demand to $30,000 (he originally demanded far more than
that).
Version D subjects (acceptable demand) were told that Mr.
Jones's lawyer has reduced his demand to $20,000 (an amount satisfy-
ing the aspiration). Version E subjects (low demand) were told that
Mr. Jones's lawyer has reduced his demand to $10,000 (an amount
exceeding the aspiration). All subjects were then asked how many
more hours they would negotiate in an effort to reduce Mr. Jones's
settlement demand before accepting his best offer.179
If differences in average responses result from the size of the of-
fers faced, we would predict a linear decline in patience across Ver-
179 Although Versions C and D substantively pose the same problem as Versions A and
B respectively, the C and D stimulus materials are worded slightly differently than the A
and B materials, but identically to the Version E materials (except, of course, for the differ-
ence in the plaintiff's settlement demand). Thus, Version E results are compared to Ver-
sion C and D results, rather than Version A and B results.
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sion C, D, and E subjects, parallel to the linear decline in demands
faced by the subjects in the different groups. In contrast, if differ-
ences in average responses are driven by whether aspirations are satis-
fied, then we would expect a large difference between the responses
of Version C and D subjects, but little if any difference between the
responses of Version D and E subjects. The results support the latter
hypothesis. Version C subjects (n = 12) reported that they would con-
tinue to negotiate for 4.75 additional hours on average, significantly
more than the 1.67 hours reported by Version D Subjects (n = 21).180
Version E subjects (n = 21), in contrast, reported that they would con-
tinue to negotiate for 1.14 additional hours on average, a number
only slightly smaller and not significantly different than that reported
by the Version D subjects.' 8 l
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Recall that the standard model of settlement predicts that negoti-
ators with more patience will achieve more-desirable outcomes that
those with less patience. 18 2 A litigant who is a more persistent bar-
gainer imposes greater transaction costs and delay costs on his oppo-
nent. If these costs are high, the opponent will accept a smaller share
of the cooperative surplus than she otherwise might have in order to
bring the negotiation to a close and stop incurring these costs. Thus,
180 p =.00.
181 p =.20.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 42-47.
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if Hypothesis #3 is correct, negotiators with high aspirations should
achieve more-profitable settlements, on average, than negotiators with
low aspirations.
d. The Opponent's Frame and Patience
Whether patience is indicated in settlement bargaining depends
on the amount of utility the litigant stands to gain from obtaining a
more desirable settlement. It also depends, however, on the likeli-
hood that bearing the costs of patience will result in such a gain. The
probability of success depends, in turn, on the amount of patience
that the opposing litigant is likely to exhibit; a negotiator who demon-
strates fortitude in the bargaining process will not improve her out-
come if her opponent is willing and able to demonstrate the same
degree of fortitude. This analysis suggests that a negotiator should be
less willing to bear the costs of ongoing bargaining if she believes that
her opponent will ultimately prove to be relatively more patient than
if she believes that her opponent will prove to be relatively less pa-
tient. If higher aspirations translate into an increased willingness to
bear the costs of patience, as the previous experiment suggests, it is
conceivable that the opponent's aspirations will affect a litigant's degree
of persistence in settlement bargaining.
In many circumstances, of course, a litigant will not have knowl-
edge of his opponent's aspirations, because aspirations are not exter-
nally visible. In some circumstances, however, relevant clues might be
available, whether stemming from the opponent's reputation or infor-
mation conveyed at the bargaining table. Hypothesis #4 posits that
litigants will be less patient when they have reason to believe their
opponent possesses high aspirations than when they have reason to
believe that their opponent possesses low aspirations.
To test this hypothesis, in the following scenario ("Insurance De-
fense"), subjects were asked to take on the role of the defendant's
attorney in a lawsuit. They were asked to consider a situation in which
they have spent an afternoon negotiating with the plaintiff's lawyer, at
the end of which the plaintiffs lawyer reduced his settlement demand
to a point somewhat below the defendant's reservation price. Version
A subjects (high-aspiration opponent) were provided with the follow-
ing information:
Mr. Green and Mr. Brown had a car accident, and Mr. Green filed a
lawsuit against Mr. Brown alleging that the latter's negligence
caused the accident. You are a lawyer for National Insurance Com-
pany ("National"). Mr. Brown is covered by an insurance policy
with National, and you have been assigned to represent him in the
lawsuit. After examining the facts of the case, you decided that Na-
tional would be better off paying Mr. Green up to $40,000 to settle
the case out of court rather than risk a trial. (National would be
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better off going to trial than paying any amount greater than
$40,000.) You have full authority to settle the case on behalf of your
client.
Mr. Green's lawyer, Pat Westin, is a very competent and aggressive
lawyer with a reputation for trying to get "top dollar" for every case.
Through your contact with other plaintiffs' attorneys, you had
heard that Westin set a goal for himself of obtaining a settlement of
$60,000 in this case.
After spending an afternoon vigorously negotiating the matter, Wes-
tin has offered to settle the case if you will agree (on behalf of Na-
tional) to pay his client $35,000. You have scheduled another
negotiating session, at which you hope to convince Westin to reduce
his settlement demand even further.
Version B (low-aspiration opponent) subjects were provided the
same first and third paragraphs, but the middle paragraph was al-
tered, as follows:
Mr. Green's lawyer, Pat Westin, is a very competent and reasonable
lawyer with a reputation for having realistic settlement goals.
Through your contact with other plaintiffs' attorneys, you had
heard that Westin set a goal for himself of obtaining a settlement of
$20,000 in this case.
All subjects were then asked how many additional hours they
would negotiate, in an attempt to convince Attorney Westin to lower
his demand further, before settling the case. Answer options ranged
from "0 hours (settle now for $35,000)" to "10 or more hours." Ver-
sion A subjects (n = 30)-those facing a plaintiff's attorney with high
aspirations-reported that they would negotiate for an additional 2.1
hours, on average. Version B subjects (n = 30)-those facing a plain-
tiff's attorney with low aspirations-reported that they would negoti-
ate an additional 5.3 hours, on average. The responses of the two
subject groups are significantly different, 183 suggesting that negotia-
tors might be more patient when their opponents have low aspirations
than when their opponents have high aspirations. Because patience is
a settlement lever, more patience on the part of a negotiator can
translate into more-desirable outcomes.
Negotiators with high aspirations will tend to be patient in bar-
gaining due to their desire to avoid disutility associated with settling
for less than their aspiration. But if an opponent has high aspirations,
the negotiator might decide to exhibit less patience because there is
likely less ground to be gained. In contrast, patience might be indi-
cated when the negotiator faces opponents with low aspirations, be-
cause such opponents are likely to be less patient themselves. An
183 p = .00.
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additional hypothesis is that if high aspirations cause inflated reserva-
tion prices and/or inflated views of what settlement amounts would be
fair, then the negotiator facing a high-aspiration opponent might in-
fer that the available portion of the bargaining zone is likely to be
small relative to what it would be if the opponent had low aspirations.
A smaller bargaining zone might suggest that less effort is warranted,
because the risk of impasse is relatively high, and the amount of coop-
erative surplus that could possibly be gained from the added effort is
relatively low.
e. Framing and Bluffing
Assuming that litigants might use aspirations as reference points
from which they evaluate the utility of potential settlements, prospect
theory suggests that there are potential implications for litigants' risk
preferences and patience that might impact settlement negotiation
outcomes. Recall that, according to the standard model of settlement,
litigants will reject settlement proposals superior to their reservation
price if the expected gains from potentially convincing the opponent
to agree to an even more desirable settlement exceed the expected
costs from the possibility of impasse. 8 4 This prediction begs the ques-
tion of how litigants will assess and compare the utility consequences
of a safe choice (accepting a certain settlement that exceeds the liti-
184 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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gant's reservation price) with a risky choice (rejecting a proposed set-
tlement) that carries the potential of obtaining a more desirable
settlement but also the possibility of causing an impasse.
Rational choice theory generally assumes that litigants will be risk
averse when comparing the expected value of agreeing to a particular
settlement to the expected value of rejecting it.185 Prospect theory
predicts, however, that individuals will behave in a risk-seeking man-
ner in the face of losses, taking larger risks to avoid losses than they
would be willing to take to achieve gains of equal size. 186 This suggests
that a litigant who evaluates prospective settlements in reference to
his aspiration level will tend to engage in riskier behavior when a cer-
tain settlement is inferior to his aspiration level than when the same
settlement is superior to his aspiration. This, in turn, leads to Hypoth-
esis #5: litigants evaluating a settlement proposal that is inferior to
their aspiration level will be more likely to reject the proposal in
hopes of obtaining a more desirable settlement than will litigants eval-
uating a settlement proposal that exceeds their aspiration level.
To test this hypothesis, subjects were given a scenario ("Construc-
tion Contract") that asked them to play the role of the lawyer for a
plaintiff who had received a settlement offer higher than her reserva-
tion price and had to decide whether to reject the offer in an effort to
"bluff' the defendant into making a higher offer. Subjects receiving
Version A (high aspiration) of the scenario learned the following:
You have been hired to represent LiveMore, Inc., a property devel-
opment firm, in a dispute with Buildem Construction Company.
Buildem recently completed construction of a multimillion dollar
apartment complex for LiveMore. LiveMore charges that Buildem
failed to comply with a number of specifications in the contract,
using somewhat shoddier materials than those that were specified.
The apartment complex is operating and is fully functional, but
LiveMore believes that the complex will require more maintenance
and repairs in the future than would have been the case if Buildem
had followed the contract specifications exactly. Buildem concedes
that it did occasionally substitute some materials for those specified
in the contract, but it claims that the substitutions were insignificant
and never compromised quality, and that LiveMore has suffered no
damages as a result. LiveMore has given you full authority to decide
on its behalf whether to settle the case out of court or litigate the
matter.
Prior to meeting with Buildem's lawyer to discuss the possibility of
settlement, you examined the evidence, consulted with experts in
the construction industry, and reviewed the relevant law in your ju-
risdiction. Your conclusion was that some of LiveMore's claims are
185 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
186 See, e.g., Heath et al., supra note 3, at 93.
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very strong and some are less strong. Given the damages a court
would likely award, the uncertainties associated with litigation, and
the costs of litigation, you determined that LiveMore would be bet-
ter off settling the matter out of court rather than litigating if
Buildem would pay LiveMore at least $100,000. (If Buildem would
not pay at least $100,000, you determined that LiveMore should liti-
gate the matter.) Wanting to recover as much money as possible for
your client, however, you set as your negotiating goal to convince
Buildem to pay LiveMore at least $250,000 to settle the matter.
After a series of meetings between you and Buildem's attorney at
which preliminary offers and counteroffers were exchanged,
Buildem has offered to pay $175,000 to settle the matter out of
court. You are now considering whether-as a negotiating strat-
egy-to tell Buildem that you will litigate the matter unless Buildem
substantially increases its offer. Such a statement would not be true,
of course, but it is the type of "bluff' sometimes used in settlement
negotiations. Such a bluff might cause Buildem to increase its set-
tlement offer, but it also would create some risk that negotiations
would break down entirely.
Version B subjects (low aspiration) received identical informa-
tion, except that the last sentence of the second paragraph read:
Wanting to recover as much money as possible for your client, how-
ever, you set as your negotiating goal to convince Buildem to pay
LiveMore at least $150,000 to settle the matter.
All subjects were then asked to rate on a scale of 1-10 (1 meaning
"definitely not" and 10 meaning "definitely") how likely they were to
"bluff' in this situation. Version A subjects (n = 30)-those with an
aspiration level higher than the settlement offer-gave an average re-
sponse of 5.2; Version B subjects (n = 31)-those with an aspiration
level lower than the settlement offer-gave an average response of
4.1. Thus, subjects with high aspirations were more likely to take the
riskier action of rejection, with its possibility of greater rewards but
also its greater risk. Subjects with low aspirations were more likely'to
take the safer action of accepting the settlement proposal that was
clearly inside the bargaining zone. The difference between the aver-
age responses of the two groups, although not large in an absolute
sense, is marginally significant. 187
If a litigant rejects a settlement proposal and demands a more
favorable proposal, impasse might result. In the absence of impasse,
however, the litigant will obtain an outcome that is superior to what
he would have obtained had he accepted the original offer. Thus,
once again, the results suggest that high aspirations can lead to more-
desirable settlements for litigants than can low aspirations.
187 p = .08 (one-tailed p - .04).
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3. Qualifying the Experimental Conclusions
This Part has presented the reference point theory of aspirations,
which is consistent with, but requires a modification of, the standard
theory of settlement. It has further defined the contours of the theory
by developing a series of specific, testable hypotheses. Finally, this
Part has provided the results of a series of experiments that are consis-
tent with the theory. The results demonstrate that the theory provides
a plausible description of reality. It is important to note, however,
that the experimental results are not offered as proof of the theory,
nor do they prove that the theory is correct, even for the population
of experimental subjects. Thus, this Article should be understood pri-
marily as an exercise in theory building rather than theory testing, as
the latter task calls for further research.
The experimental results do not, alone, prove the reference
point theory, because they cannot distinguish between two possible
explanations for the results: that aspirations affect settlement levers,
and that settlement levers affect aspirations. The theory posits the fol-
lowing causal relationships between aspirations, settlement levers, and
settlement bargaining outcomes:
ASPIRATIONS -- SETTLEMENT LEVERS -4 OUTCOMES
Although the experimental results are consistent with the posited set
of causal relationships, they are also consistent with the following set
of causal relationships:
ASPIRATIONS (-- SETTLEMENT LEVERS -- OUTCOMES
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High aspirations might have affected subjects' determinations of
their reservation prices, their views about what would constitute a fair
outcome, and their determinations of how much patience to display
and the level of risk to prefer. Alternatively, the high aspiration pro-
vided by an experimental scenario might have caused subjects to as-
sume that the given aspiration level reflected certain material facts
about settlement levers. For example, subjects might have inferred
from the aspiration level that they had a higher likelihood of prevail-
ing in court than the instructions otherwise suggested, that fairness
norms suggested a high settlement value, that they were playing the
role of a litigant who is patient or risk-preferring, or perhaps that they
must have an undisclosed reason to believe their opponent had a low
reservation price. s8  If subjects interpreted a high aspiration as a sig-
nal of particular values of settlement levers, rather than as indepen-
dent variables, then their responses to the questions posed in the
hypothetical scenarios might reflect their understanding of these sig-
nals rather than of the independent causal power of aspirations.'89
The conventional view of aspirations within negotiation scholar-
ship implicitly assumes that aspirations are a psychological construct
determined independently of the variables herein labeled "settlement
levers." This assumption is implicit because the widespread prescrip-
tive advice that negotiators should set high aspirations suggests that
aspiration levels are a matter of choice for individual negotiators, even
in the face of a fixed set of external constraints. If settlement levers
such as reservation price, views of fairness, or estimates of the oppo-
nent's reservation price completely determined a negotiator's aspira-
tions, then it would make little sense to advise negotiators to "change"
their aspirations. This advice would make as much sense as advising a
person to change his height. Consequently, it is important for future
research to unpack further the correlation between aspiration levels
and settlement levers, and to determine in which direction causation
runs. Such research would test not only the reference point theory of
aspirations, in particular, but also might determine, more generally,
188 Cf Henrik Kristensen & Tommy Grling, Determinants ofBuyers' Aspiration and Reser-
vation Price, 18J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 487, 490 (1997) (hypothesizing that aspirations are deter-
mined by the negotiator's belief about his opponent's reservation price).
189 It is worth noting that the considerable social science literature on the effect of
goals generally suffers from this same problem. People are more likely to choose goals that
they think are appropriate and attainable. See Latham & Locke, supra note 91, at 220.
Most experiments concerning goals are structured so that subjects are assigned goals by
the experimenters. Cf. id. at 233 (noting that most goal setting experiments do not explic-
itly emphasize self-regulation because the experimenters assign the goals). In these experi-
ments, it is always possible that subjects might infer information from the provided goal
(for example, that it is appropriate and attainable), making it uncertain whether differ-
ences in goals provided-rather than information inferred from those goals-are driving
study results.
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whether and to what extent negotiators can manipulate their own
aspirations.
This research program, while important to developing a better
understanding of aspirations, will be challenging to implement. In
any between-subject experimental design (such as the experiments
presented in this Article) in which aspirations are presented to sub-
jects as exogenous variables and manipulated between groups of sub-
jects, it is always difficult to ensure that subjects will not interpret a
given aspiration level as a signal about the value of one or more en-
dogenous variables (such as settlement levers, for example).
Rather than manipulating experimenter-provided aspirations, re-
searchers could ask subjects to determine and report their own aspira-
tions, and could use regression analysis to evaluate the strength of the
correlation between self-chosen aspirations and settlement levers.
This technique would avoid the problems caused by subjects inferring
different informational signals from experimenter-provided aspira-
tions, because all subjects would respond to the same external facts
concerning the negotiating context. However, this technique would
raise other questions. For example, if, compared to low-aspiration
subjects, high-aspiration subjects were to report higher reservation
prices, higher "fair" settlement amounts, more patience, or a greater
preference for risk, it would be unclear whether the difference in re-
sponses was caused by the difference in aspirations, or whether some
third factor had a causal influence on both the reported aspiration
levels and the reported dependent variable levels. For example, it is
conceivable that self-confident subjects might report high aspirations
with, say, high reservation prices.190 If results were to show that sub-
jects who set high aspirations also set high reservation prices, one still
could not conclude with certainty that high aspirations caused high
reservation prices, because it would be possible that optimism caused
subjects to establish both high aspirations and high reservation
prices. 191
190 Cf Cynthia Kay Stevens et al., Gender Differences in the Acquisition of Salary Negotiation
Skills: The Role of Goals, Self-Efficacy, and Perceived Control, 78 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 723, 733
(1993) (finding that self-efficacy and perceived control affect goal-setting behavior in
negotiation).
191 Careful experimenters might respond to this possibility by having subjects com-
plete a diagnostic device designed to judge optimism, and then test the correlation be-
tween aspirations and reservation prices holding optimism constant. But a virtually
unlimited number of factors that could conceivably affect aspirations and settlement
levers, making it all but impossible for experimenters to rule out conclusively the "third
variable" possibility.
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IV
REVISITING PRESCRIPTIVE ADVICE: SHOULD NEGOTIATORS SET
HIGH ASPIRATIONS?
A. Benefits of High Aspirations
Negotiation texts that present a normative view of aspirations uni-
formly argue that high aspirations are desirable because they help
negotiators achieve better bargaining outcomes for themselves or
their clients. 19 2 The reference point theory of aspirations described
in Part III suggests that the descriptive claim underlying this advice
might be accurate for a variety of reasons:
1. Negotiators with high aspirations might set higher reservation
prices, thus skewing the range of mutually agreeable outcomes in a
way that is beneficial to the negotiator.
2. Negotiators with high aspirations might determine that fairness
requires a more profitable outcome for themselves, thus skewing
the range of possible settlements in their favor.
3. Negotiators with high aspirations might demonstrate more pa-
tience at the bargaining table, which should, on average, improve
the negotiator's payoff when a settlement is reached.
4. Negotiators with known high aspirations might cause their oppo-
nents to demonstrate less patience and thus to accept less desirable
settlements than they otherwise would.
5. Negotiators with high aspirations might be more likely to reject
offers that are superior to their reservation price, thus forcing the
opposing party to make concessions in order to assure an
agreement.
The reference point theory of aspirations, however, also implies
that establishing high aspirations can have undesirable consequences.
The theory implicitly suggests that high aspirations carry with them
two types of costs: a higher risk of bargaining impasse, 193 and less satis-
faction with settlements that eventually are reached. 19 4 In determin-
ing whether high aspirations are desirable on balance in a particular
bargaining context, negotiators must carefully weigh these two costs
against the notable benefits. This conclusion suggests that, in contrast
to the conventional wisdom, there is no context-independent answer
to the question of whether high aspirations will benefit a litigant more
than would low aspirations.
B. Increased Risk of Impasse
All of the reasons for the reference point theory's suggestion that
high aspirations might lead to more-desirable bargaining outcomes
192 See sources cited supra note 87.
193 See discussion infra Part W.B.
194 See discussion infra Part V.C.
[Vol. 88:1
ASPIRATIONS AND SETTLEMENT
simultaneously imply a higher risk of bargaining impasse. For exam-
ple, holding all other variables equal, litigants with higher reservation
prices should obtain more-desirable settlements if their opponent's
reservation price is sufficient to create a bargaining zone. But a
higher reservation price also reduces the likelihood that there will be
a bargaining zone, and thus increases the risk of impasse.
For example, if a defendant has a reservation price of $100,000, a
plaintiff with a reservation price of $80,000 should be expected, on
average, to achieve a higher settlement amount than would a plaintiff
with a reservation price of $20,000. The range of possible settlement
values is smaller for the high-reservation-price plaintiff and skewed to-
ward larger dollar figures. But if the defendant's reservation price is
$60,000, rather than $100,000, the plaintiff with an $80,000 reserva-
tion price will find herself with no settlement at all, while the plaintiff
with a $20,000 reservation price is likely to reach an agreement for
some amount between $20,000 and $60,000. To the extent that high
aspirations might cause litigants to establish higher reservation prices
than they otherwise would, the resulting reduction in the size of the
bargaining zone carries with it an increased risk of impasse.
Precisely the same analysis applies if higher aspirations increase
litigants' likelihood of rejecting offers that exceed their reservation
price, either because high-aspiration litigants are more likely to per-
ceive a particular settlement proposal as unfair, or because high-aspi-
ration litigants are more likely to determine that the expected benefits
of bluffing outweigh the countervailing risks. In either circumstance,
assuming a settlement agreement is reached, a high-aspiration plain-
tiff is likely to obtain a more favorable settlement price than would a
low-aspiration plaintiff, because the former will reject proposals that
are at the lower end of the bargaining zone (close to her reservation
price). If the defendant's reservation price is low, however, the higher
settlement requirements of the high-aspiration plaintiff might exceed
the defendant's reservation price, thus causing a bargaining impasse.
Even if the defendant's reservation price is high, he might refuse to
accept settlements that are acceptable to the high-aspiration plaintiff
if his own aspirations are also high. That is, the defendant might re-
ject as unfair or for purposes of strategic bluffing settlement proposals
that are lower than, but close to, his reservation price,just as the high-
aspiration plaintiff might reject possible settlements higher than, but
close to, her reservation price.
If aspirations affect litigants' patience in settlement negotiations,
high aspirations can increase the risk of impasse for related but
slightly different reasons. First, the more patient a litigant's bargain-
ing behavior, the more likely it is that his opponent will conclude that
no bargaining zone exists (even when this conclusion is mistaken)
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and consequently break off settlement talks. Second, over the course
of a protracted bargaining process, the relative preference of one or
both litigants for settlement over adjudication may decrease, poten-
tially eliminating a bargaining zone. For example, if trial preparation
(including discovery) proceeds concurrently with settlement negotia-
tions, the cost advantage of settlement relative to adjudication will de-
crease the longer negotiations proceed. This, in turn, can cause
rational plaintiffs to increase their reservation prices and rational de-
fendants to reduce theirs. In time, a defendant's reservation price
that was comfortably higher than a plaintiff's reservation price on the
day suit was filed can fall below that plaintiff's reservation price, mak-
ing impasse inevitable. In addition, even when patience enables a liti-
gant to obtain a more desirable settlement price, the marginal
improvement must be balanced against the costs of exercising the
marginal patience.
Impasse in settlement negotiations is not always an undesirable
outcome, of course. When informed litigants diverge in their esti-
mates of the expected value of adjudication, 195 or when one or both
parties perceive that adjudication can provide a benefit that settle-
ment cannot (such as public vindication), I 6 it is possible that no set-
tlement amount will be mutually beneficial relative to adjudication.
In such situations, adjudication is appropriate. But when a mutually
beneficial settlement is possible, failure to reach a settlement is unfor-
tunate for each of the litigants, and is socially inefficient as well.
Therefore, while high aspirations provide negotiators with the benefit
of an improved chance of obtaining a more favorable settlement, they
carry with them a significant cost for litigants, as they make it more
likely that settlement negotiations will fail when the potential for a
mutually beneficial accord exists.
C. Reduced Satisfaction with Outcomes
A second cost to litigants of adopting high aspirations is the po-
tential that they will obtain less utility from any eventual settlement
amount than they might have enjoyed had they instead maintained
lower aspirations. Recall that in the "Arnold and Charles" scenario1 97
195 See, e.g., Priest & Klein, supra note 18, at 12-13 (stating that a sufficient condition
for trial is PP-Pd>(C-S)/J, where P, = plaintiff's estimate of his percentage chance of winning
at trial, Pd = defendant's estimate of plaintiff's chance of winning at trial, C = the litigants'
combined trial costs, S = the litigants' combined settlement costs, and J = the expected
amount that will be awarded to the plaintiff if he succeeds at trial).
196 See, e.g., Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 65, at 113-14 (stating that settlement will
be less likely if the parties do not have equivalent stakes in the dispute, such as when one
party is a repeat player-like an insurance company-that wants to establish favorable pre-
cedent for future claims).
197 See supra Part ilI.A.2.
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nearly all subjects thought Arnold, who had a $10,000 aspiration and
obtained a $15,000 settlement, would be happier than Charles, who
obtained the same settlement but had an aspiration of $20,000. The
higher a litigant's aspiration, of course, the less likely she will be to
achieve the aspiration, often resulting in less satisfaction for the liti-
gant, even holding outcomes constant.
Research on goal setting provides a body of support for the gen-
eral finding that, in a variety of contexts, higher performance goals
result in lower participant satisfaction with outcomes. 198 In the nego-
tiation context, experimental evidence suggests that higher aspira-
tions will have negative utility consequences for bargainers, even when
both parties' aspirations are superior or both are inferior to the
amount of the negotiated agreement. For example, Leigh Thompson
presented subjects with a scenario in which they were asked to imag-
ine that they were the seller of a boat, that they sold the boat for
$175,000, and that they had a reservation price considerably lower
than that amount. 199 She then manipulated given aspiration levels be-
tween subjects, but all subjects were given aspiration levels comforta-
bly above the sale price.200 When asked to rate how successful they
felt about the outcome of the hypothetical bargain, subjects who were
told their aspiration level was $250,000 reported feeling significantly
more successful than subjects with an aspiration level of $300,000; sub-
jects with the $300,000 aspiration reported feeling significantly more
successful than subjects with a $350,000 aspiration level. 201 These re-
sults suggest that higher aspirations are likely to have a negative effect
on litigant satisfaction with a settlement outcome, even when the in-
crease in aspiration level does not cause a litigant to perceive a settle-
ment amount as a loss rather than a gain.20 2
198 See, e.g., Latham & Locke, supra note 91, at 222; AnthonyJ. Mento et al., Relationship
of Goal Level to Valence and Instrumentality, 77 J. A.PPLiED PSYCHOL. 395, 403 (1992) ("The
differences between people with high standards and those with low standards is that the
former must accomplish more to satisfy themselves than the latter."); cf Oliver et al., supra
note 100, at 269 (finding that higher negotiator expectations decrease satisfaction with
outcomes).
199 Leigh Thompson, The Impact of Minimum Goals and Aspirations on Judgments of Success
in Negotiations, 4 GROUP DECISION & NEGOTIATION 513, 516 (1995).
200 Id. at 517.
201 Id. at 518; see also Polzer & Neale, supra note 119, at 12-13 (finding that negotiation
subjects given easy, specific goals reported more satisfaction with their negotiated out-
comes than did subjects given "do-your-best" goals).
202 In addition to reduced utility gained from the negotiated agreement in question,
low subjective satisfaction with an outcome can have negative tangible effects on negotia-
tors in some situations. For example, evidence suggests that negotiators' desire to negoti-
ate with a particular partner in the future depends in large part on satisfaction with
previous outcomes. Oliver et al., supra note 100, at 270. If future negotiations with that
partner could be profitable, a reduced desire to negotiate with her could be costly to the
negotiator. Because litigants rarely have the luxury of choosing their negotiating partner
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From a prescriptive perspective, whether negotiators should per-
mit the utility consequences of aspirations to affect the aspirations
that they adopt prior to settlement negotiations is a difficult question,
for two different reasons. First, it might be possible for the negotiator
to mitigate the negative utility consequences of high aspirations by
choosing to ignore her ex ante aspiration level when evaluating an
agreement ex post. Galinsky and his coauthors found that, holding
constant a reservation price and a higher target price, subjects told to
focus attention on the latter reported better objective outcomes but
less satisfaction with their outcomes than did subjects told to focus
attention on the former.20 3 However, when the subjects told to focus
on their target price during the negotiation were asked to write down
their reservation price after the negotiation, but before rating their
level of satisfaction with the agreement, these subjects were as satisfied
with their outcomes as were the subjects originally told to focus on
their reservation price.2 04 If negotiators are able to take conscious
steps to avoid the potential negative utility consequences of high aspi-
rations, there is no reason for them to alter their behavior based on
those consequences.
Second, in settlement negotiations, a lawyer-negotiator might be
able to shield her client from the psychological costs of high aspira-
tions. For a litigant negotiating on his own behalf, any expected mon-
etary benefit of high aspirations relative to low aspirations must be
weighed against the lower expected level of satisfaction. One defining
feature of litigation bargaining, however, is that the principal parties
are almost always represented by lawyer-agents. If the agent estab-
lishes bargaining aspirations but does not communicate them to the
client, the subjective utility consequences of those aspirations should
affect only the agent's satisfaction with the outcome, and not the
client's.
Assuming that the benefits of high aspirations outweigh their
costs to the client (a debatable assumption given the increased risk of
impasse caused by high aspirations), a faithful agent should ignore
the subjective utility consequences to himself. The agent's fee can be
viewed, in part, as compensation for shielding the principal from
these negative utility consequences of high aspirations, and the ability
to avoid these costs can be viewed as a benefit to clients of employing
lawyer-agents rather than negotiating on their own behalf.
or choosing not to negotiate with an undesirable partner, however, this negative conse-
quence of low satisfaction is unlikely to be relevant in the litigation settlement context.
203 Galinsky et al., supra note 120, at 11-22.
204 Id. at 20-21.
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CONCLUSION
Negotiation experts, including members of the legal academy,
routinely assume that aspirations affect bargaining outcomes, and
there is empirical evidence that supports this assumption. Neverthe-
less, there has been very little in the way of specific, theoretical de-
scriptions of the mechanism or mechanisms by which aspirations
affect bargaining outcomes, and no empirical testing of the few theo-
retical descriptions that do exist. Perhaps more troubling, the stan-
dard model of litigation settlement, developed over two decades by
interdisciplinary scholars working first in the law-and-economics tradi-
tion and later in the law-and-behavioral-science tradition, implicitly as-
sumes that aspirations are not at all relevant in the settlement context.
This Article has attempted to advance the study of the role of
aspirations in litigation settlement specifically, and in negotiation gen-
erally, by proposing a conceptual framework that incorporates aspira-
tions into the standard model of settlement. The reference point
theory of aspirations posits that, by serving as a reference point for
various decisions facing negotiators in the bargaining process, aspira-
tions have an indirect causal effect on settlement outcomes by directly
affecting the "settlement levers" recognized as relevant by the stan-
dard model of settlement. The experimental results reported in Part
III.B demonstrate that the reference point theory is plausible, but this
study is clearly only a small step toward a deeper understanding of the
role of aspirations in settlement negotiations.
If the reference point theory of aspirations is correct, high aspira-
tions will help a negotiator achieve more-favorable bargaining results
when a deal is reached, but at the cost of a higher risk of bargaining
impasse and less overall satisfaction with bargaining outcomes. Thus,
the reference point theory not only offers a new way of thinking about
the role of aspirations in settlement from a descriptive perspective, it
also presents a challenge to the usual prescriptive advice that negotia-
tors should always set high aspirations.
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